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I. INTRODUCTION

The landscape of international jurisprudence is changing. How the
international community applies law to individuals, companies, and
countries outside the physical boundaries of the forum state is still being
developed. In some respects, the United States leads the way in seeking to
establish the rule of law cross-culturally and internationally. The past two
decades have seen an explosion of litigation in the United States concerning
activities and nationals of other countries. Much of this litigation involves
the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS").' The ATS came into prominent modern use
when the Second Circuit decided Filartiga v. Pena-Irala in 1980.2 The
application of the ATS has proved problematic; it does not seem to mandate
a clear limit to its application nor a firm foundation for its use. For example,
while the Second Circuit paved the way for the use of the Act, 3 the D.C.
Circuit rejected its application in a manner that left some doubt for the ATS'
future application. The Supreme Court has not espoused on the Act's reach
nor resolved the issues illuminated by the D.C. Circuit. A clear mandate for

I. Occasionally referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act, its proper name is the Alien Tort
Statute ("ATS"). The ATS was passed as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and is currently codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003).
2. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
3. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that "certain forms of
conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state
or only as private individuals").
4. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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the use of the Act in prosecuting offenders of certain crimes such as
genocide or torture arises prominently from the circuits, but a vast array of
complications ensue even from these. Perhaps most daunting of these
complications are the implications of extraterritorial application of the ATS
and how it acts within the universality principle of prescriptive jurisdiction.5
This Article seeks to address that issue. The ATS has become
increasingly utilized in human rights litigation. Ramifications stem from its
use that may exceed the individual benefits to litigants in particular cases.
Part It of this Article reviews the history of the ATS and the seminal case of
Part III focuses on the doctrine of
Filartiga and its progeny.
extraterritoriality and universal jurisdiction as it applies to the ATS.6
Finally, Part IV addresses concerns raised in these prior parts and suggests
some limits to the ATS' application.
II.

THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE

A. Background to the A TS
Congress passed the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATS") as part of the
Judiciary Act of 1789.' The statute provides, "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."8

5. This Article refers to prescriptive "universal jurisdiction" and "the universality principle."
They are, for all intents and purposes, the same thing.
6. Scholarship regarding the ATS is vast. Much of it focuses on the debate raised by the
concurring opinion of Judge Bork in Tel-Oren.

See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 788-823 (Bork, J.,

concurring). Judge Bork posited that while the ATS provided jurisdiction for a federal court to hear
claims of aliens under the law of nations, it did not provide a cause of action for claimants beyond
any recognized under the law of nations.

See id. at 803-05 (Bork, J.,concurring).

While this

position is highly controversial and has been debated at length, for the purposes of this Article, it
may be assumed that "tort" should be interpreted as broadly as possible under current American

jurisprudence and "only" limits the ATS to such wrongs. For a reasoned analysis of these terms (in
addition to other ATS analysis), see William R. Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction
over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 489, 499-501

(1986) (providing a strong background for the passage and plain meaning of the ATS).
7.
8.

Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and ForeignAffairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 680 (2000).
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003). Originally, the ATS provided that the district courts "shall also

have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case
may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States." See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), I Stat. 73 (1789) (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2003)). The concurrent state jurisdiction was removed in 1878.
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1. Constitutional Background and the Judiciary Act of 1789
It is well established that the Delegates' Constitutional Convention
recognized the importance of a sole federal power over foreign relations. 9
Compliance with the law of nations' and treaty obligations were paramount

concerns expressed not only at the convention, but also in the Federalist
Papers.'"
Many of these concerns arose out of defects in the Articles of
Confederation. 2 The Articles allowed Congress to appoint ambassadors,
make foreign relation decisions, and approve treaties. 13 However, several
states routinely went outside the scope of the Articles by appointing their
own ambassadors and negotiating separate treaties in conflict with federal
ones. 14

These infractions caused James Madison to comment that the

greatest defect of the Articles was that it permitted the states miscreant
power over foreign affairs.' 5 In The Federalist No. 3, John Jay commented
that "it is of high importance to the peace of America, that she observe the
laws of nations ... and ... it appears evident that this will be more perfectly

and punctually done by ' one
national Government, than it could be... by
6
thirteen separate States."'
Thus it was that the Delegates confirmed federal authority over foreign

affairs in the Constitution. " Not only, however, in the prevalent treaty,

9. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 33 (1975).
Professor
Henkin asserts: "The Framers were strongly committed to the law of nations and assumed that the
United States would share that commitment." Id. at 234. Professor's Henkin's assertion is
unassailable in light of the literature of the time - but whether the Framers' understanding of what
comprised the "law of nations" was then as it is now is questionable.
10. The "law of nations" is today commonly referred to as "Customary International Law." As
some courts use one term or the other, and likewise with scholars, this Article does not differentiate
between the two and uses the terms interchangeably. However, they may not be the same thing.
Another interesting and perhaps important question is raised by this statement as well: did the
Framers contemplate countries holding non Judeo-Christian concepts of the law of nations as being a
part of the whole? Numerous references to the law of nations of only "civilized" countries combined
with the Western 18th century concept of what "civilized" meant indicates they likely did not. One
noted Framer, James Wilson, wrote of the law of nations that it was the "law of nature." "The law of
nations, as well as the law of nature, is of obligation indispensable ... of origin divine." James
Wilson, Of the Law of Nations, in 3 THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION 70 (Phillip B. Kurland and

Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
11. See Kenneth C. Randall, FederalJurisdictionover InternationalLaw Claims: Inquiries into
the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 12 (1985).

12. See id.
13.

-IENKIN, supra note 9, at 33.

14. Id.
15. J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF CONSTIUTIONAL CONVENTION 60 (E. H. Scott ed., 1893).
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 14-15 (John Jay) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
17. See Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United
States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 37 (1952).
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ambassador, and war powers of the legislative and executive branches, 8 but
in vesting in the federal judiciary jurisdiction over matters concerning
foreign affairs, aliens, or states. 19
The basic grant of jurisdiction over foreign affairs to the federal
judiciary occurs in Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution, which
grants judicial power over:
[A]I1 cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls; ... to Controversies...
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens
or Subjects. 0
This power was implemented in part by the Judiciary Act of 1789.2 1 This
Article is primarily focused on the ATS rather than the broad subject of
foreign affairs.
The jurisdiction provided to the federal courts over aliens and foreign
relations included so-called "alienage jurisdiction."23 This conferred power
on the federal courts to hear disputes between aliens and citizens where the
amount in controversy exceeded five hundred dollars.24 However, this
jurisdiction did not provide a means for aliens to sue other aliens in federal

18. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 9.
19. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Randall, supra note 11,at 14 (arguing that "[t]he

wisdom of the convention in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts
appointed by, and responsible only to one national Government, cannot be too much commended").
20. Randall, supra note 11, at 14. Several commentators and at least one prominent judge have
opined that the lack of express legislation giving power to courts over cases arising out of the law of
nations may require express causes of action beyond the text of the ATS. For one judge's support of
this position, see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798-823 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring). See also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith Ill, The Current Illegitimacy of
InternationalHuman Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997).
21. Randall, supra note I1,at 15.
22. See id. A more thorough and yet general discussion of the grant of foreign relations
jurisdiction via the Judiciary Act can be found in JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., ANTECEDENTS AND
BEGINNINGS TO 1801: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 457-508 (1971).

See also Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the FederalJudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARV.
L. REV. 49 (1923).

23. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11,1 Stat. 73 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
(2003)).
24. Id. Alienage jurisdiction is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2003). Section II also provided
for diversity jurisdiction with the same monetary requirement.
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court.2 5 Thus, our inquiry must turn to that portion of the Judiciary Act that
conferred specific jurisdiction over torts brought by an alien in violation of
the law of nations.26
While the whole of the Judiciary Act served to confer broad jurisdiction
over aliens upon the federal courts,27 the ATS conferred a unique type of
jurisdiction: the power of an alien to sue another alien. 28 The purposes for
this unique jurisdiction are often glossed over by academics in an attempt to
lump the Alien Tort Statute in with general federal question jurisdiction,29 or
to simplify the common law adoption of the law of nations so as to support
its broadest use. 30 Yet, in the context of extraterritoriality, the Founders'
aims in so limiting jurisdiction become manifest and dictatorial.'
The first publicized case prior to the adoption of the Constitution, which
sealed in the Framers' minds intent to provide national remedies for offenses
against the law of nations, occurred in 1784 in Philadelphia. 2 A Frenchman
25. In Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809), the Supreme Court held that an
alien may not sue another alien under "alienage jurisdiction." See also Dassigienis v. Cosmos
Carriers & Trading Co., 442 F.2d 1016 (2d Cir. 1971). Indeed, Section 1332 does not permit an
alien to sue another alien, even where citizens may be parties. See Lavan Petroleum Co. v.
Underwriters at Lloyds, 334 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
26. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
(2003)).
27. As Professor Randall characterizes it:
Thus, together with jurisdiction over actions involving dignitaries, alienage jurisdiction,
and the removal provision [allowing aliens to remove cases in diversity to federal courts
much the same as citizen diversity jurisdiction removal], the Alien Tort Statute put into
effect the Framers' general intention to establish federal jurisdiction over actions
involving aliens.
Randall, supra note 11, at 17.
28. Id. at 16-17. Obviously, there is no prohibition against suing an American citizen either but,
as distinct from the alienage jurisdiction, this is a unique aspect of the ATS.
29. See id. at 19. "[Tihe Alien Tort Statute thus provided an additional basis for federal
jurisdiction - somewhat analogous to federal question jurisdiction - over a special class of actions
brought by aliens." Id.
30. Professor Casto suggests that because the law of nations was a part of the common law, the
same breadth of jurisdiction given to common law causes of action should be granted to the Alien
Tort Claims Act. For more specific support of this proposition, see Casto, supranote 6, at 489, 499501.
31. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article 11, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587 (2002).
There are a number of possible reasons why the Founders would have decided not to
grant the federal courts a general law of nations jurisdiction. First, they might have
believed that a grant of jurisdiction over all cases arising under the law of nations would
be too vague. ... Second, the Founders may not have wanted to give the federal courts
jurisdiction over certain law of nations issues [such as international mercantilism] ....
[I]f Article Ill allowed the federal courts to hear all cases arising under the law of nations,
it would mean that they potentially could hear all cases involving general commercial
law, even in disputes between citizens of the same state. ...
Finally, it is possible that the Founders believed that their specific list of cases.., would
encompass all of the disputes likely to implicate the United States' international relations.
Id. at 599-600 (footnotes omitted).
32. See Respublica v. De Longchamps, I U.S. (I Dall.) 11I, 111 (1784).
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named the Chevalier De Longchamps, who was noted to be of "obscure and
worthless character"33 assaulted and battered the Secretary of the French
Legation.34 Being bereft of power to succor the enraged international
community, Congress merely offered a reward for the miscreant's
apprehension and encouraged state authorities to prosecute him."
Eventually caught and tried by state officials in Pennsylvania, De
Longchamps was convicted and punished after the Court found the law of
nations to be a part of Pennsylvania's state law.36
The case caused a national uproar and illuminated the Continental
Congress' weakness when confronted with offenses against the law of
nations, even where another nation's ambassador to America was
threatened.37 Thus, when the Constitutional Convention began three years
later in the same city in which the De Longchamps scandal occurred, the
Convention undertook to remedy the lack of national power.38

33. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (May 25, 1784), reprinted in 7 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 288-89 (J. Boyd ed., 1953) [hereinafter PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON].
34. See De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) at I 1l.Two incidents comprised the charges as found
in De Longchamps. One involved an assault in the house of the French ambassador and the other, an
instigated fight in the streets of Philadelphia. Id. at II1-12. De Longchamps further threatened the
ambassador and Mr. Marbois (the target of his assaults) with assassination if the prosecution was not
halted. See PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 289.
35. 27 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 478-79 (1984).

36. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (I Dali.) at 114-17.
37. See Casto, supra note 6, at 493. Professor Casto suggests that the state's indecisiveness as
expressed by Thomas Jefferson elicited the "real foreign affairs problem ... that the United States
might fail to provide an appropriate sanction or remedy." Id. at 493; see also id. at 493 n.146.
38. Id. at 493. Edmund Randolph, the governor of Virginia, opened the Convention by noting
the lack of national authority over the law of nations. See Letter from Edmund Randolph, Governor,
Virginia, to the Honorable Speaker of the House of Delegates (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION

OF THE UNITED STATES 262-63

(P.

Ford ed.,

1888).

Commenting that "[i]f the rights of an ambassador be invaded by any citizen it is only in a few
States that any laws exist to punish the offender." Id. Governor Randolph was joined by James
Madison, who feared the country's inability to "prevent those violations of the law of nations & of
treaties which if not prevented must involve us in the calamities of foreign wars." Casto, supranote
6, at 494. The reader should note, however, that despite the woeful tidings of Randolph and
Madison, Pennsylvania did adopt the law of nations as their own common law and successfully
prosecuted and punished De Longchamps. See supranotes 28-32 and accompanying text.
Thus, the question is beget, whether it was an issue more of appearances and embarrassment for the
fledgling country, the United States of America, than realistic need. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO.
42, at 279 (James Madison) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 534 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961); THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 15 (John Jay) (Jacob Cooke ed.,
1961). While each eloquently set forth justification for federal jurisdiction, their primary support is
summed up by Madison's "one nation" concept and the virtually identical Jay/Hamilton argument
that "the peace of the whole ought not to be left at the disposal of a part." THE FEDERALIST No.3, at
14 (John Jay) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis omitted). These arguments are strongly persuasive
for the establishment of federal jurisdiction over foreign affairs, but they do not precisely address the

During the Constitutional Convention the second notorious scandal occurred
in New York City.39 A New York City police officer entered the house of
the Dutch Ambassador and arrested one of his servants allegedly without
cause. 40 The Ambassador loudly complained to John Jay, then the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs.4t Jay once again lamented the lack of federal powers to
deal with such conflicts: "[T]he federal Government does not appear ... to
be vested with any judicial Powers competent to the Cognizance and
Judgment of such Cases ... .,4' This event further galvanized the Delegates
in their desire for a federal power over suits brought by aliens. 43 Thus the
desire for federal jurisdiction over suits intended to protect ambassadors
became one of the motivating factors behind the ATS. 44The protection of
ambassadors is one of the classic protections offered by the law of nations as
restated by William Blackstone in the fourth volume of his Commentaries.45
Blackstone characterized these laws thusly, "[t]he principle offences against
the law of nations ... are of three kinds; 1. Violation of' 46safe-conducts; 2.
Infringement of the rights of ambassadors; and, 3. Piracy.

concern of Governor Randolph because the grant of federal jurisdiction over offenses against the law
of nations is no different than the adoption by the Pennsylvania state court in the De Longchamps
matter. Casto, supra note 6, at 493-94.
Arguing that many pieces of a whole must be represented by a sole entity with uniform laws does
not mean individual parts necessarily fail in their duties. For example, modem environmental laws
often only apply where state laws prove inferior. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were not
adopted because similar rules did not exist, but for consistency. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry
Friedman, Federal Judicial Independence Symposium: The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46
MERCER L. REV. 757, 780 (1995). It seems clear from the foreign relations context and need for a
strong federal government that Madison, Hamilton, and Jay were arguing for a centralized
government not merely to protect individual ambassadors (for in truth Pennsylvania had done an
adequate job), but to promulgate security and clear authority in the conduct of foreign relations by
the federal government. This justification, while reasonable, is less a response to the miscreance of a
single Frenchman (no civil claims were even ever filed either in the De Longchamps matter or the
Dutch Ambassador affairs) than an affirmation of the United States as a viable single entity capable
of negotiating and enforcing multinational agreements.
39. See Casto, supra note 6, at 494.
40. Letter from P.J. Van Berckel, to John Jay (Dec. 18, 1787), reprinted in 3 A FOUNDER'S
CONSTITUTION: DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 1783-87.

41. Id.
42. SECRETARY

FOR FOREIGN AFF.

REP. ON THE COMPLAINT OF MINSTER OF UNITED

NETHERLANDS (Mar. 25, 1788), reprinted in 34 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 109,
II (1788).
43. See Casto, supra note 6, at 444. Once again, however, the state merely adopted the law of
nations as part of its common law, and in this case, New York, convicted and sentenced the errant
constable to three months in jail. Id; see also sources cited supra note 38.
44. See Casto, supra note 6, at 499.
45. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 56 (Morrison ed.,
Cavendish Publ'g Ltd. 2001) (1769).
46. Id. at 54.
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2.

Commentator Thoughts on the Background to the ATS

Scholars have suggested additional rationales for the adoption of the
ATS portion of the Judiciary Act.47 One of the most prominent viewpoints
is that of Professor Anthony D'Amato.4t Professor D'Amato suggests that
"the overriding purpose [for the Alien Tort Statute] was to maintain a
rigorous neutrality in the face of the warring European powers. ' 49 Professor
D'Amato's historical analysis concluded that the climate of the fledging
United States of America required a heightened sense of security for
nationals of foreign countries.50 According to Professor D'Amato, "two or
three centuries ago, the plight of individual citizens in foreign countries, and
not territorial ambitions, was the major excuse for war." 51 In response to
suggestions made by Judge Robb in the Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic
case, 52 Professor D'Amato pointed to the need of an impartial executive
branch in conflicts between other nationals, thus supporting the goal of
neutrality.53
Another noted commentator expanded upon the reasoning given by
Professor D'Amato.54 William Dodge posits that the ATS "provid[ed] the
broad civil remedy for violations of the law of nations that the Continental
Congress had sought since 1781 ." While Professor Dodge agrees that the
ATS was passed in response to the ambassadorial incidents, he cites two

47. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82
AM. J. INT'L L. 62, 63 (1988).
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 63-64.
51. Id. at 64.
52. Judge Robb argued that the power to adjudicate foreign national disputes is, or should have
been, vested in the executive branch. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 823-27
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robb, J.,
concurring).
53. D'Amato, supra note 47, at 66. The best illustration of this derives from another historical
incident. In 1794, a French assault upon British holdings in Sierra Leone, led by an American slaver
and with assistance from other Americans, brought great ire to the British. Id. Either supporting the
British by condemning the American actions and thereby angering the French, or vice-versa, would
have placed the tenuous United States of America in a delicate position, Id. It must be noted,
however, that even at this early date, the limitations suggested in this Article were not exceeded.
The actions of the company that assaulted the holdings in Sierra Leone would almost certainly have
been deemed acts of piracy, and since the primary actors to be sued were American, the obvious
United States nexus existed. For a complete description of this event, see CHRISTOPHER FYFE, A
HISTORY OF SIERRA LEONE 59-61 (Oxford Univ. 1962).
54. See Casto, supra note 6, at 63.
55. William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the
"Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221,237 (1996).

679

other impetuses for passage of the ATS. He first asserts that the states did
not have adequate laws to protect foreigners, but that their courts "would be
hostile to alien claims."56 Professor Dodge points to the famous quote of
James Madison for support: "We well know, sir, that foreigners cannot get
justice done them in these [state] courts, and this has prevented many
wealthy gentlemen from trading or residing among us."57 Secondly asserted
by Professor Dodge was the difficulty foreign creditors were faced with in
pursuing claims in state courts. While such claims were excepted from the
ATS,59 clearly, the Founders' concern for the protection of the interests of
foreign nationals encouraged adoption of the federal statute.60
While the reasons for the inclusion of a federal statute providing a
forum for alienage jurisdiction are manifest, 61 Professor Dodge best sums up
the basis for the ATS' passage: "by providing a federal remedy for [torts in
violation of the law of nations], the First Congress could protect against the
vagaries of state law, the hostility of state courts, and differences in their
interpretations of the law of nations, sparing the new nation...
embarrassment. '62
B. The A TS in Case Law and the Modern Era

Perhaps strangely considering the importance placed upon its passage by
the Founders, the ATS lay dormant for roughly 200 years following its
passage.63 In two cases that arose fast on the heels of its passage, courts

noted the ATS' grant of jurisdiction supplemental to their
maritime/admiralty jurisdiction.64 Over 100 years later, the Supreme Court,

56. Id. at 235.
57.

JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION

OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 583 (Reprint Services Corp. 1891).
58. Dodge, supra note 55, at 235.
59. Seeid. at236n.104.
60. See Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1440-53; see also Dunlop v. Ball, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 180 (1804) ("Until the act of 1793 ...a general opinion prevailed among the inhabitants of
the state of Virginia ...that a.British debt could not be recovered."). The collection of British debt
was a source of great controversy at the time, but it certainly was considered in the passage of the
ATS. See Bradley, supra note 31, at 624.
61. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 31,47.
62. Dodge, supra note 55, at 237 (emphasis omitted).
63. Id. at 251.
64. See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D. S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F.
Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9,895). Both cases involved the capture of foreign ships in United
States territorial waters. The significance of these early cases' reliance upon the maritime
jurisdiction of the courts is downplayed by Professor Dodge with respect to the use of the ATS as a
basis for jurisdiction over torts in general, but such reliance illustrates a respect for extraterritoriality
concerns during the early uses of the ATS. Dodge, supra note 55, at 252-53. One distinction for the
discriminating reader: Bolchos actually rested jurisdiction in the ATS, Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. at 810-1I,
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in the seminal case of The PaqueteHabana, mentioned it again.65 But it was
not until 198066 that the ATS arose from its virtual torpor in Filartiga v.
67
Pena-Irala.
Three cases, including Filartiga,have become the backbone
of ATS litigation, but the Second Circuit in Filartigaestablished the ATS as
a modem, viable statute.68
1. Filartigav. Pena-Irala
The case that began the modem era of Alien Tort Statute application
was Filarligav. Pena-Irala.69 The plaintiffs in Filartigawere a father and
sister of a young man who was brutally tortured and murdered by the ruling
political party in the Republic of Paraguay. 70 The plaintiffs contended that
Joelito Filartiga was kidnapped and tortured to death on March 29, 1976, as
retaliation for his father's well-known anti-government stance. 7
While
living in Washington D.C., the plaintiffs discovered the defendant was in
New York and, after securing local counsel, personally served the defendant
and brought their claim under the ATS.72
Two important things unique to the Filartigas' tragedy bear immediate
note.73 First, Dr. Filartiga (Joelito's father) brought a criminal action in the

while Moxon merely referred to it. Moxon, 17 F. Cas. at 947-48.
65. 175 U.S. 677, 685-86 (1899). Kathleen M. Kedian analyzes the effect of The Paquete
Habana upon later interpretations of the ATS. See Kathleen Kedian, Customary InternationalLaw
and InternationalHumans Rights Litigation in United States Courts: Revitalizing the Legacy of The
Paquete Habana, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1395 (1999).
66. A rarely discussed case arose in 1961 in the district court in Maryland involving a child
custody suit between aliens in which the ATS provided jurisdiction. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp.
857 (D. Md. 1961).
67. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
68. These cases are Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984); and Filartigav. Pena-irala,630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
Other cases have alternatively stretched or constricted the reach of the ATS, but these three are
considered by many scholars to be the seminal modem ATS doctrinal cases.
69. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
70. See id. at 878.
71. Id. Some of these alleged facts belie objective summary:
Later that day, the police brought Dolly Filartiga [Joelito's sister] to [Defendant] Pena's
home where she was confronted with the body of her brother, which evidenced marks of
severe torture. As she fled, horrified, from the house, Pena followed after her shouting,
"Here you have what you have been looking for for so long and what you deserve. Now
shut up." The Filartigas claim[ed] that Joelito was tortured and killed in retaliation for
his father's political activities and beliefs.
Id.
72. Id. at 878-79.
73. Id.

Paraguayan courts, which, at the time of the federal lawsuit, was still in
process.74 Second, personal jurisdiction was easily and clearly established
by "tag" jurisdiction in New York.75 These two issues, unconsciously or
not, left the Filartigapanel with no need to address personal jurisdiction or
any failure to exhaust local remedies.76
The Second Circuit panel first required a clear violation of "the law of
nations., 77 Defining the law of nations thus became the first order of
business for the panel, and it started by reviewing Supreme Court
jurisprudence on this issue. 78 Relying upon the expression contained in The
Paquete Habana,79 the Filartiga panel reviewed the authorities for

determination of the law of nations and then noted the unequivocal
condemnation of the use of torture by "civilized nations."8 ° The court found
that the conduct alleged in Filartigaclearly violated this aspect of the law of
nations. 8'

74. Id. at 878. However, Dr. Filartiga's Paraguayan counsel "was arrested and brought to police
headquarters where, shackled to a wall, Pena threatened him with death. This attorney, it is alleged,
has since been disbarred without just cause." Id.
75. Id. at 879. Pena was being held on deportation charges at the Brooklyn Navy Yard when
served. Id. The plaintiffs successfully held Pena's deportation so he could answer charges, and he
brought the successful motion to dismiss which was the subject of the circuit court's review and
eventual reversal. Id.
76. The Torture Victim Protection Act requires exhaustion of local remedies. See Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73. Of course, the Filartiga court's failure to
examine extraterritoriality and universal jurisdiction is inexcusable and discussed at length in Part IV
of this Article.
77. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880. While the panel in Filartiga chose to use the term "the law of
nations," in most modem jurisprudence this term has been abandoned in favor of the term
"customary international law." They mean the exact same thing, but for purposes of continuity I will
continue to use the term "the law of nations."
78. See id. "The law of nations 'may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing
professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions
recognizing and enforcing that law."' Id. (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160-61
(1820)). It is noteworthy that not only the order in which these sources are listed might be
considered counterintuitive, but they furthermore recognize the importance of reviewing
international law in a manner similar to the modus of the courts in other countries. See, e.g.,
Cochran v. Taylor, 7 N.E.2d 89 (N.Y. 1937) (utilizing civil law source method by looking to
scholars and commentaries first). The Filartiga court made a vast (if harmless) error, however, in
not consulting what are clearly the most important sources of the law of nations, Congress and the
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10. For a discussion on the use of the Offenses Clause
with respect to extraterritoriality, see Zephyr Rain Teachout, Note, Defining and Punishing Abroad:
Constitutional Limits on the Extraterritorial Reach of the Offenses Clause, 48 DUKE L.J. 1305
(1999).
79. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
80. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881-82. The court also wisely noted that a particular rule need not be
adhered to by every single nation. Id. at 881. "Were this not so, the courts of one nation might feel
free to impose idiosyncratic legal rules upon others, in the name of applying international law." Id.
81. Id. This is another important point because in many later cases, the greatest issue facing
litigants was whether or not something violated the law of nations. Proof of a tort, and proof of alien
status are both patent. Proof of violation of the law of nations is extremely fact-sensitive, and thus,
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The next hurdle for the plaintiffs was the defendant's argument that
personal jurisdiction should not suffice to allow the court to adjudicate
between two aliens.8 2 The court quickly dismissed this argument by
pointing out that "[i]t is not extraordinary for a court to adjudicate a tort
claim arising outside of its territorial jurisdiction."83 The court then summed
up its appraisal:
Although the Alien Tort Statute has rarely been the basis for
jurisdiction during its long history, in light of the foregoing
discussion, there can be little doubt that this action is properly
brought in federal court. This is undeniably an action by an alien,
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations . 84

2.

Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic

85
Tel-Oren v.
The next important case in the line of Filartiga'sprogeny,
6
Filartiga.1
after
Libyan Arab Republic, arose just a few years
Tel-Oren involved the claims of survivors and relatives of persons
murdered and injured by a terrorist attack in Israel by the Palestine

torture's implication as a clear violation was important insofar as the reach Filartigahas had, and
should have. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring) ("This case deals with an area of the law that cries out for clarification by
the Supreme Court. We confront at every turn broad and novel questions about the definition and
application of the 'law of nations."').
82. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 885.
83. Id. Once again, the court failed to address the presumption against extraterritoriality or any
of the five types of prescriptive jurisdiction. See id.
84. Id. at 887. In explaining the dearth of authority on the ATS, the court further surmised that
"the narrowing construction that the Alien Tort Statute has previously received reflects the fact that
earlier cases did not involve such well-established, universally recognized norms of international law
that are here at issue." Id. at 888. The court discusses other cases that refused to recognize a
particular wrong as an offense against the law of nations. See id. The court pointed out one amusing
example:
For example, the statute does not confer jurisdiction over an action by a Luxembourgeois
international investment trust's suit for fraud, conversion and corporate waste.... Judge Friendly
astutely noted that the mere fact that every nation's municipal law may prohibit theft does not
incorporate "the Eighth Commandment, 'Thou Shalt not steal' ... (into) the law of nations." It is
only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely
several, concern, by means of express international accords, that a wrong generally recognized
becomes an international law violation within the meaning of the statute. Id. (alterations in original)
(citation omitted).
85. The district court in Filartiga was reversed and the case remanded, id. at 889, but the
eventual disposition of Filartigais not important to the substance of this Article.
86. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

Liberation Organization ("PLO").8 7 The attack took place on March 11,
1978, when thirteen terrorist-members of the PLO seized civilian buses, a
car, and a taxi.88
In the course of the attack, the terrorists tortured and shot and killed
twenty-two adults and twelve children, and seriously wounded seventy-three
adults and fourteen children.89 Most victims were Israeli, but some
Americans and Dutch were also affected. 90 These plaintiffs brought their
claim in the District of Columbia against a number of defendants, including
the PLO. 9'

Although all three judges on the Tel-Oren panel agreed to affirm the
decision of the district court to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, their reasoning greatly diverged. 92
Judge Edwards reasoned that while Filartigahad been properly decided,
and torture is properly prohibited by the law of nations, such referred to
"official" torture as perpetrated by a state actor.93 In Tel-Oren, Judge
Edwards posited that the "[p]laintiffs ...[did] not allege facts to show that
official or state-initiated torture [was] implicated., 94 Judge Edwards,

therefore, backed off application of Filartigabecause, as he put it, the court
would then have to determine "whether to stretch Filartiga'sreasoning to
incorporate torture perpetrated by a party other than a recognized state or

one of its officials acting under color of state law." 95

87. Id. at 776.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 775. Judge Edwards, in his concurring opinion, pointed out that he was self-limiting
his analysis "tothe allegations against the Palestine Liberation Organization [because] ...the
complainants' allegations against the Palestine Information Office and the National Association of
Arab Americans [were] too insubstantial to satisfy the § 1350 requirement ...[and] [j]urisdiction
over Libya [was] barred by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act." Id. at 775 n.l (Edwards, J.,
concurring). Commentators have disagreed as to whether this analysis is correct in light of Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks,
Filartiga's Firm Footing: International Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 463, 480-97 (1997) (explaining and discussing Sabbatino's admonition that the Act of State
Doctrine does apply to the law of nations and, therefore, the ATS); cf GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 743 (3d ed. 1996) (explaining that
"Sabbatino appears to have rejected [the notion of an exception to the Act of State Doctrine for the
law of nations]").
92. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 774. The three D.C. Circuit judges were Judge Edwards, Judge Bork,
and Judge Robb. Each filed a separate concurring opinion joining no part of any of the others'. See
id.
93. Id. at 791 (Edwards, J., concurring).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 792 (Edwards, J., concurring). Judge Edwards further asserted that applying Filartiga
principles would "require an assessment of the extent to which international law imposes not only
rights but also obligations on individuals." Id. Judge Edwards conjured horrible burdens on the
federal courts to determine the reach of this customary international law and agonized over whether
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Judge Bork took a new, and then-to-date unique tack.96 He also held to
affirm the dismissal of the action, but on the theory that the ATS provides
jurisdiction but no cause of action for violations of the law of nations. 97
Judge Bork suggested that implicating a cause of action would, in effect,
make the ATS self-executing and go beyond that which Congress intended
or undertook.98 He pointed out that making such a determination would
stray too far into the prerogative of the executive to conduct foreign affairs
and, thus, implicated the political question doctrine. 99 Finally, Judge Bork
asserted that the "law of nations" should be strictly construed, and
application of the ATS to any violation of international law is be beyond the
purview of the statute.'00 Judge Bork, therefore, concurred in the holding
because he reasoned that the ATS did not provide a cause of action not
otherwise recognized by Congress either expressly by statute,' 0 or clearly
recognized by the First Congress during the ATS' passage.'0 2
Finally, Judge Robb concurred on the basis that the issue presented to
the panel was non-justiciable based on the political question doctrine. 0 3 He

they would apply to individuals. Tel Oren, 726 F.2d at 792. This attitude is somewhat confusing
because the ATS was passed in the wake of a need to expressly allow for claims against individuals,
not state actors. See supra notes 36-54 and accompanying text. Thus, Judge Edward's reasoning for
distinguishing Tel-Oren from Filartiga is unclear at best and, at worst, would bar all claims against
non-state actors under the ATS because they are not subject to the law of nations, and would bar all
non-exemption claims against state actors under the ATS due to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act.
96. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798-823 (Bork, J.,
concurring).
97. Id. at 803, 823 (Bork, J.,concurring). For a criticism of this point of view, see Anthony
D'Amato, Judge Bork svConcept of the Law of Nations Is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J.INT'L L. 92
(1985).
98. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 808-12 (Bork, J., concurring).
99. Id. at 803-07 (Bork, J.,
concurring).
100. Id. at 812 (Bork, J., concurring). "[A]ppellants' construction of [the ATS] ...would
authorize tort suits for the vindication of any international legal right." Id. Judge Bork then delved
into the history of the law of nations, and reviewed the Founder's conception of proper offenses. Id.
at 816 (Bork, J.,concurring). This analysis has proven influential, especially in light of Judge
Bork's wise admonition that "Congress' understanding of the 'law of nations' in 1789 is relevant to
a consideration of whether Congress, by enacting [the ATS], intended to open the federal courts to
the vindication of the violation of any right recognized by international law." Id. Whether Judge
Bork is correct regarding the type of offense Congress intended to guard against, a review of the
climate surrounding the adoption of the ATS is useful herein because of potential jurisdictional
limits.
101. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73; discussion
infra Part 11-B(4).
102. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
103. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823-26 (Robb, J., concurring). Judge Robb based this assertion on one
fundamental but unspoken difference from the other judges - that the act of terrorism committed by
the defendants was a political or wartime act and not that of a private tortfeasor in the classic sense.

held that the diplomatic and foreign relations concerns inherent in such a
decision implicate other branches of the government, and consequences of a
judicial determination would have been potentially embarrassing or
damaging to our national interests. 10 4 Thus, no clear precedential value
flows from Tel-Oren for courts to follow, but it has spawned many of the
current debates regarding the propriety of the Alien Tort Statute.0 5
Tel-Oren illustrated three of the primary concerns touching application
of the ATS: in precis, (i) what entities are subject to the ATS; (ii) what
comprises the law of nations and does it include concurrent causes of action
for litigants; and (iii) where does discretion better judicial valor and the
political question doctrine's rearing head step in to limit the ATS'

application?

06

3. Kadic v. Karadzic
While a number of other cases over the past two decades have relied
upon Filartiga as a basis for applying the ATS,'0 7 arguably the most
08
important was Kadic v. Karadzic.'
The gravamen of Kadic concerned allegations against citizens of the
10 9
former Yugoslavic Republic (now the nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina).
The plaintiffs in Kadic alleged brutal acts of genocide," 0° as perpetrated by
the Bosnian-Serb military under command of President Karadzic."'

See id.
at 825 (Robb, J., concurring).
104. See id. at 823-26 (Robb, J., concurring); discussion infra Part IV-B.
105. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
106. These questions are addressed, at least fundamentally, in each of the concurring opinions of
Tel-Oren, respectively. Of the three questions, however, this Article focuses (if at all) only on
question three.
107. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th Cir. 1999) (extending
application of the ATS and TVPA to what amounted to "mental anguish" but not to environmental
abuses); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (1Ith Cir. 1996) (utilizing the TVPA as support
for the court's finding of jurisdiction under the ATS and power to "fashion domestic common law
remedies to give effect to violations of customary international law"); Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d
353, 357, 372 (D. N.J. 1998) (holding, in action by detainees against INS for alleged mistreatment,
cruel treatment is cognizable as a violation of the law of nations); White v.Paulsen, 997 F.Supp.
1380, 1387 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (declining to exercise jurisdiction based upon, inter alia, a lack of
cause of action theory); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 187 (D.Mass. 1995) (holding that
"any act by the defendant which is proscribed by the Constitution of the United States and by a
cognizable principle of international law.., is actionable before this Court under § 1350").
108. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
109. Id.
at 236.
110. Such acts were described by the court as "various atrocities, including brutal acts of rape,
forced prostitution, forced impregnation, torture, and summary execution." Id. at 236-37.
1Il. Id. The court explained the complicated background and status of Karadzic:
Karadzic, formerly a citizen of Yugoslavia and now a citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is
the President of a three-man presidency of the self-proclaimed Bosnian-Serb republic
within Bosnia-Herzegovina, sometimes referred to as 'Srpska' .... In his capacity as
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By the time Kadic was decided, the Second Circuit had the benefit of
nearly twenty years of hindsight and, thus, tested plaintiffs' ATS claims in a
succinct and definitive fashion. 12 The central issue considered by the court
with respect to the ATS claim, however, was whether an individual actor
could violate the law of nations. 1 3 The court conducted a review of
international law crimes and concluded that the district court on remand
would need to determine which crimes were genocide or war crimes (that
14
may require state action) and which were other atrocities (that may not)."
While Kadic refined the use of the ATS in modem litigation, Filartiga
remains the seminal case on its application." 5 However, Kadic incorporated
into its calculus the Torture Victim Protection Act. 16

President, Karadzic possesses ultimate command authority over the Bosnian-Serb
military forces, and the injuries perpetrated upon plaintiffs was [sic] committed as part of
a pattern of systematic human rights violations.
Id. at 237.
112. Although the standards for subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS were clear to the Kadic
court, the facts underlying them were not. Inconsistent positions were taken by both the plaintiffs
and defendant ascertaining the question posed by Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren, but not answered:
Whether private actors can be liable for violations of the law of nations. See supranotes 87-91 and
accompanying text. The Kadic court summed up the confusion:
Karadzic contends that appellants have not alleged violations of the norms of
international law because such norms bind only states and persons acting under color of a
state's law, not private individuals. In making this contention, Karadzic advances the
contradictory positions that he is not a state actor, even as he asserts that he is the
President of the self-proclaimed Republic of Srpska. For their part, the Kadic appellants
also take somewhat inconsistent positions in pleading defendant's role as President of
Srpska, and also contending that "Karadzic is not an official of any government."
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239 (citations omitted) (quoting Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 21 n.25, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 949035).
113. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239. The court further divides this issue into how state action pertains to
the separate claims of genocide, war crimes, and other offenses. Id. at 240. The Kadic panel then
held effectively that plaintiffs should be allowed to prove Karadzic was a state actor "for purposes of
those international law violations requiring state action." Id. at 245.
114. Id. at 244.
It suffices to hold at this stage that the alleged atrocities are actionable under the Alien
Tort Act, without regard to state action, to the extent that they were committed in pursuit
of genocide or war crimes, and otherwise may be pursued against Karadzic to the extent
he is shown to be a state actor.
Id.
115. Id.at237.
116. Id. at 245.
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4.

The Torture Victim Protection Act

In 1992, Congress enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act
("TVPA")." 7 This Act provided a civil remedy against a defendant who:
"(1) subject[ed] an individual to torture... ; or (2) subject[ed] an individual
to extrajudicial killing."" '8 The TVPA has the effect of providing not only a
clear-cut cause of action for plaintiffs (in any courts that might otherwise
adopt Judge Bork's Tel-Oren reasoning), but also gives the right to sue to

U.S. citizens who otherwise would not be able to sue under the ATS." 9
Congress apparently 20 sought in the TVPA to enhance the .reach of the ATS
rather than limit it.' 2' Scholars disagree on whether the effect of the TVPA
properly

enhanced

the

ATS or was

inconsistent

with

prior ATS

jurisprudence. Doubt arises too, from the power of Congress to pass such a
vast statute.1 22 Concerns raised by the minority report illuminate this doubt:
"[The TVPA] appears to over-extend Congress' constitutional authority....
It is a difficult and unresolved question, therefore, whether [the power to
define and punish offenses against the law of nations] extends to creating a

117. See28U.S.C.§ 1350(1992).
118. Id. § 2(a)( I)-(2). Note that liability only attaches to those acting "under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation." Id.
119. See S. REP. No. 102-249 (1991).
120. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 91, at 481-97 (1997) (arguing TVPA supports ATS
litigation). But see Bradley & Goldsmith I11,supranote 20 (arguing in the alternative that the TVPA
conflicts with current ATS litigation).
121. See S. REP. No. 102-249 (1991). Congress apparently announced its support of the ATS as
well as its Filartigaapplication:
The TVPA would establish an unambiguous basis for a cause of action that has been
successfully maintained under an existing law, section 1350 of title 28 of the U.S. Code,
derived, from the Judiciary Act of 1789 (the Alien Tort Claims Act) which permits
Federal district courts to hear claims by aliens for torts committed "in violation of the law
of nations." Section 1350 has other important uses and should not be replaced.... The
Filartiga case has met with general approval.... At least one Federal judge, however,
has questioned whether section 1350 can be used by victims of torture committed in
foreign nations absent an explicit grant of a cause of action by Congress .... The TVPA
would provide such a grant, and would also enhance the remedy already available under
section 1350 in an important respect: while the Alien Tort Claims Act provides a remedy
to aliens only, the TVPA would extend a civil remedy also to U.S. citizens who may have
been tortured abroad. Official torture and summary executions merit special attention in
a statute expressly addressed to those practices. At the same time, claims based on
torture or summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions that may appropriately be
covered by section 1350. Consequently, that statute should remain intact.
Id. (citation omitted). Curiously, the majority report notes Judge Bork's theory without disclaiming
it. Clearly the TVPA establishes torture as a violation of the law of nations and gives both United
States citizens and aliens a cause of action therefore; more than that is unclear, however.
Furthermore, the question must be raised: if Congress so strongly supported the ATS, why did it
only expressly provide for torture and extrajudicial killing as causes of action? The TVPA continues
to be the source of much confusion among the federal courts. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith I11,
supra note 20.
122. See S. REP. NO. 102-249 (1991).
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civil cause of action in this country for disputes that have no factual nexus
with the United States or its citizens."' 123 However, courts that have
addressed the ATS and the TVPA have found them to be complimentary,
and have refused, thus far, to view the explicit grant of a cause of action in
the case of torture and extra-judicial killings as a reason to require such
explicit grants in other cases not concerning torture and extra-judicial

killings. 124
C. A TS and the "Law of Nations"

"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.' 25 As has already been shown, the primary
inquiry confronting courts in applying the ATS is just what constitutes the
law of nations. 126 Thus, before determining how far the reach of United
States courts should be in light of extraterritoriality,
the meaning of the
127
phrase "law of nations" must be examined.

123. Id. The Minority Senate Report thus raises a similar question to that which this Article seeks
to address: whether Congress can pass laws affecting interests with no United States nexus, and if so,
should it? The Minority Report continues:
The Department of Justice noted, and we agree, that "(s)uch a unilateral assertion of
extraterritorial jurisdiction would be in tension with the framework of the (U.N.
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment)." According to the administration, the convention requires countries to
provide remedies for acts of torture which took place only within their own territory. In
fact the convention specifically declined to extend coverage to acts committed outside the
country in which the lawsuit is brought. We do not wish to second-guess the experts who
drafted this treaty, and believe it is unwise to do explicitly what its drafters chose not to
do - extend the coverage to extraterritorial actions.
Id.
124. See supra notes 104, 118 and accompanying text. The intersection of queries regarding the
cause of action question and the extraterritoriality question must lie for another day. While it is
recognized that some scholars and Judge Bork argue the fallacy of this reasoning, as the majority of
courts have done, this Article assumes the ATS does not require a separate statement from Congress
granting specific causes of action. Professors Bradley and Goldsmith notwithstanding, the length to
which the ATS should be applied in light of extraterritoriality principles does not depend on whether
a cause of action must be expressly granted by statute separate from the ATS and, thus, is not more
fully-explored in this Article. For a recent discussion of the scholarly debate on the cause of action
issue, see Bradley, supranote 31, at 592 n.2 1.
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003).
126. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
127. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. "Customary international law" enjoys frequent
modem usage, but by no means exclusive usage, and is arguably more descriptive than historically
accurate.
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1. Blackstone and Vattel
Two sources contemporary to the Founders provide useful illumination
to the background of the term "law of nations": William Blackstone's
Commentaries and an important work on international law, Vattel's The Law
of Nations or the Principlesof Natural Law. 28 Blackstone summarized the
principle offenses against the law of nations as violations of safe-conducts,
infringements on the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. 129 This limited list
of offenses conveys the narrow sense of international 3law as Blackstone
understood it, but Vattel did not share this narrow scope.
Vattel first pointed out that the law of nations is derived from "the duties
which the Law of Nature imposes upon Nations."' 13' He, however, asserted
that international "injuries" that may be addressed by a nation as a violation
of the law of nations are those that are waged on a national, state-sponsored
scale.'32 These instances comprise the only times Vattel suggested that
violations of the law of nations may be judged and executed upon by foreign

128. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 45; 3 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE
PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 113-47 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1758).
129. BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at 54.
130. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. This avoids discussion of what are "non
principle offenses." Such is beyond the scope of this Article.
131. VATTEL, supra note 128, at 113. Further, "Since Nations are bound by the Law of Nature
mutually to promote the society of the human race, they owe one another all the duties which the
safety and welfare of that society require." Id. Lest the reader think Vattel was advocating
unrestricted application of domestic law or adjudication into other nations' spheres of influence, note
his admonition:
(I) Sovereign States, or the political bodies of which society is composed, are much more
self-sufficient than individual men, and mutual assistance is not so necessary among
them, nor its practice so frequent. Now, in all matters which a Nation can manage for
itself, no help is due it from others.
(2) The duties of a Nation to itself, and especially the care of its own safety, call for much
more circumspection and reserve than an individual need exercise in giving assistance to
others.
Id. at 114. And later:
Hence there is a strict obligation upon all Nations to promote justice among themselves,
to observe it scrupulously in their own conduct, and to refrain carefully from any
violation of it. Each should render to the others what belongs to them, respect their
rights, and leave them in the peaceful enjoyment of them.
1d. at 135. Indeed, Vattel established joint appreciation for the rules of comity as well as restraint
where, to coin a modem phrase ofjurisprudence, "all local remedies are exhausted." See Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
132. See VATTEL, supra note 128, at 130. In pertinent part:

If, then, there should be found a restless and unprincipled Nation, ever ready to do harm
to others, to thwart their purposes, and to stir up civil strife among their citizens, there is
no doubt that all the others would have the right to unite together to subdue such a
Nation, to discipline it, and even to disable it from doing further harm.... The principles
involved in the three preceding propositions [the right of self-protection, the right of
resistance, and the right of redress] constitute the several grounds upon which a just war
may be waged ....
Id.
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powers. 133 These two sources, while not exhaustive of the understanding of
international law at the time the Judiciary Act
was passed, characterize 18th
134
century understanding of the law of nations.
The only mention of the law of nations in the Constitution occurs at
Article I, Section 8, Clause 10, which grants Congress the power to "define
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the High Seas, and Offenses
against the Law of Nations."'13 Of course, the question that has confronted
most courts is what to do when
Congress has not expressly defined offenses
136
against the law of nations.
2.

The Paquete Habana

The leading case on determining the state of international law is The
Paquete Habana.137 The Paquete Habana involved a maritime doctrine of

fishing vessel protection during times of war. 138 The question the Supreme
Court grappled with was what source and precedent should guide it in the
international field of law. 139 In determining the sources of international law,
the Supreme Court affirmed that:
[w]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative
act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and
usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works
of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and

133. See id.
at 130-43.
134. See Bradley & Goldsmith Ill, supra note 20.
135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.10. Two significant possibilities arise as a result of this language.
First, Congress' power to define "Piracies and Felonies on the High Seas" is separate from offenses
against the "Law of Nations." This implies that the Founders saw a division between the two, and
did not intend a pure adoption of Blackstone's definition (which included piracy as one of the
offenses against the law of nations). The second possibility is much simpler and comports more
with other constitutional provisions: "Piracies and Felonies on the High Seas" is one aspect of law
given to Congress to define, and "the Law of Nations" is the other. Id. This reading seems
consistent with other maritime/admiralty clauses in the Constitution as opposed to other forms of law
(treaties and domestic laws). Adopting this reasoning, it seems the Founders were doing no more
than ensuring Congress would have power over both the law of the High Seas and other
internationally-implicated law. Professor Casto touches on this issue in his paper, discussed
previously. See Casto, supranote 6, at 475 n.45; see also infra note 229.
136. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Jason Jarvis, Constitutional
Constraints on the InternationalLaw Making Power of the FederalCourts, 13 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y _ (forthcoming 2003).
137. Id.
138. See id. at 677-79.
139. See id.

experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with
the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by
judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors
concerning what the law14ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence
of what the law really is.'
These sources are varied and not definitive and, thus, require a court to
enter into fundamental questions of14 1what the "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" are.

3. Other Sources of International Law
Although the law of nations comes into being by either the express
enumeration of Congress or judicially recognized norms of customary
international law, it is142both the law of the United States and supreme in its
domestic application.

Professor Louis Henkin, in explaining the source of international law,
opined that both the courts and Congress may determine what international
law is. 14 3 These sources must
refer first to treaties, executive and legislative
144
acts, and judicial decisions.
140. Id. at 700. However, the Filarliga court went a step further, asserting that "it is clear that
courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among
the nations of the world today. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (referencing
and quoting Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 198 (1796), which distinguished "between 'ancient' and
'modem' law of nations"). This does not necessarily follow, for while The Paquete Habana test
mandates a review of "customs and usages of civilized nations," The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at
700, it is a stretch to assert that a 1796 case distinguishing between ancient and modem law of
nations requires a circuit court two hundred years later to make a similar distinction. Be that as it
may, it appears well settled that the law of nations is a dynamic body of law (if it can be called that)
which evolves much as the Filartigacourt asserted.
141. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 38. The International
Court of Justice has long recognized the breadth of international law:
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding
upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by
usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to
regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view
to the achievement of common aims.
S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10.
142. See HENKIN, supra note 9, at 236-37. "International law.., is lawfor the United States in
its relations with other nations. International law is also law of the United States, U.S. law for
domestic governance." Id. at 236. Professor Henkin points out, however, that while international
law is considered covered by the Supremacy Clause, it is unclear how this status was achieved. See
id. at 237-38.
143. See id. at 239-40. Professor Henkin quotes Justice Gray's opinion in The Paquete Habanato
summarize the courts' role: "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." Id. at 239 (quoting The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. at 700). Recognizing that Congress, too, must play a role in the determination of
international law, Professor Henkin then poses the question, "Will the courts give effect to
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4.

Jus Cogens

In addition to those sources listed above which comprise that amorphous
body of law known as customary international law, there is a doctrine of
implacable natural international law known as jus cogens.145 Jus cogens is
defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as a "peremptory
norm of general international law [that] is... accepted and recognized by
the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character."' 46 Some
commonly invoked precepts of jus cogens include genocide, slavery,
extrajudicial killing, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial
discrimination, and consistent
patterns of gross violations of internationally
47
recognized human rights.

international law if the political branches determine to violate it?" HENKIN, supra note 9, at 239. He
admits that Congress has violated international responsibilities (failure to pay United Nations dues in
the 1990s), and that it is unclear the extent to which courts must defer to the executive's
understanding of international law. See id. at 241. Professor Henkin goes so far as to assert that
"[p]resumably, since [treaties and principles of customary international law] derive[] from their
character and status in international law, treaties and principles of customary law have equal status in
the U.S." Id. This conclusion is less certain than his others, however, as Congress clearly
understood the difference between treaties and the law of nations, and gave one express supremacy
and the other none. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
144. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. Later in the opinion it was stated that "[t]his rule
of international law is one which prize courts, administering the law of nations, are bound to take
judicial notice of, and to give effect to, in the absence of any treaty or other public act of their own
government in relation to the matter." Id. at 708.
145. Jus cogens has been most explicitly and recently recognized in articles 53 and 64 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, arts. 53, 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. For more thorough
scholarly discussions of jus cogens, see Gros Espiell, Self-Determination and Jus Cogens, in U.N.
LAW/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 167 (A. Cassese ed., 1979); Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects of
InternationalJus Cogens as Formulated by the InternationalLaw Commission, 61 AM. J. INT'L L.
946 (1967); and Marjorie M. Whiteman, Jus Cogens in International Law, With a ProjectedList, 7
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 609 (1977).
146. Vienna Convention, supra note 145, at art. 53.
147. The Restatement also accords these seven generally prohibited conducts jus cogens status.
They have, by and large, been adopted into ATS litigation: genocide, slavery, causing the
disappearance or murder of individuals, torture or other "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,"
arbitrary detention, apartheid, or a general pattern of gross violations of international law. Theodor
Meron, On a Hierarchyof InternationalHuman Rights, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 15 (1986). Confusion
may arise in the reader who astutely notes the similarities between what has thus far been addressed
as "customary international law" by numerous scholars and at least the Filartiga and Tel-Oren courts
and that list ofjus cogens violations. There is certainly a layer of overlap. It is more accurate, then,
perhaps to term jus cogens as a doctrine of nullification rather than an affirmative imposition of laws
from which causes of action can be drawn (i.e., the "law of nations" phraseology from the ATS.)

Thus, customary international law is established through a variety of

sources, some through express pronouncements of Congress easily within
their constitutional grants of power, and some adopted
by individual district
48
court judges in fact-sensitive litigation scenarios. 1
III. EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Having established the background to the ATS, its current scope, some

of the questions confronting courts and litigants seeking to apply it today,
and the meaning and current use of the law of nations, we now turn to its
focus: extraterritoriality and the ATS.
A.

What is Extraterritoriality?

Extraterritorial application of law is nothing more than the application
of a nation's domestic law in an international context. 49 When exercised by
a court, such application is known as "prescriptive jurisdiction.' 50
The means of extending national power extraterritorially is not a new
concept.'15
However, from its earliest use, extraterritoriality was only
thought to apply in extremely narrow circumstances: those involving an

affront to a nation itself and thus implicating a threat
to a nation's
52
sovereignty or security, and not to threats to individuals.
B. PrescriptiveJurisdiction

There are currently five commonly accepted means of extending a
nation's jurisdiction beyond the nation's borders: territoriality, nationality,
the protective principle, passive personality, and universality. 53 Of these,
This is becausejus cogens is used to nullify contracts and treaties in conflict with its principles. See
id. at note 148. "The principle ofjus cogens, which restricts the freedom of states to contract and
voids instruments that conflict with peremptory norms, has unquestionable ethical underpinnings and
unimpeachable antecedents." Id. Thus,jus cogens has less importance to the ATS than customary
international law, except insofar as its "peremptory norms" provide evidence of customary
international law.
148. See supra notes 74, 103 and accompanying text.
149. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987); see also Gary B.

Bom, A Reappraisalof the ExtraterritorialReach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1
(1992).
150. See Born,supra note 149, at 3 n.4.
151. See VATTEL,supra note128, at113-47.
152. Seeid. at 130.
153. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 402, 404 (1987). Periodically
hereinafter this Article will refer to the first four types as "United States nexus jurisdictions"because
they involve either domestic territory, a citizen of the United States (as the tortfeasor or victim), or
interests of the United States (protective or economic). The only prescriptive jurisdiction with no
United States nexus is the universality principle.
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154
territoriality is afforded the most deference and is the least controversial.
In lay terms, this is jurisdiction over persons or things that occur within the
territory of a nation. 155 The nationality principle applies jurisdiction 1to
56
citizens of the nation and has been almost universally recognized as well.
The protective principle is found in subsection (3) of Section 402 to the
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
which agrees that United States courts have extraterritorial jurisdiction over
"certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is
directed against the security of the state. ' 1 7 Controversial not only among
the nations of the world, but also within United States application, is the
"passive personality" category. 158 This principle allows a nation to punish
159
aliens who injure their citizens outside the nation's territory.

C. The UniversalityPrinciple
The fifth means of extraterritorial application of law is known as the
universality principle. 160 Universal jurisdiction rests on principles ofjus
cogens, natural law, and customary international law.' 6'
Universality
permits exercise of jurisdiction over crimes of such6 offensiveness as to be
universally hated and feared by all civilized nations. 1

154. See id. § 402 cmt. a.
155. See id. This also includes actions that cause effects within a country's territory. See S.S.
Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10.
156. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(3) cmt. a (1987); see also
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
157. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(3) (1987) (emphasis added).
158. See Cutting's Case, 2 Moore DIGEST § 201, at 232-40.
159. See id. Cutting's Case saw the United States arguing against this principle when Mexico
arrested a United States citizen for injuries caused to a Mexican citizen in the United States. Id. The
United States' position has changed in recent years - arguably as a result of an increase in antiUnited States terrorism. See, e.g., United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D. N.Y. 2000).
160. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987).
The universality
principle is explored in depth below.
161. This phrasing is not commonly used. More common is the vague explanation that universal
jurisdiction is "universally offensive" and "universally punished ...[b]ecause such crimes threaten
the very nature of humanity itself." Teachout, supra note 78, at 1312.
162. See Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV.
785 (1988). Professor Randall defines universal jurisdiction as "[providing] every state with
jurisdiction over a limited category of offenses generally recognized as of universal concern,
regardless of the situs of the offense and the nationalities of the offender and the offended." Id. at
788; see also Teachout, supra note 78, at 1312. Greater depth of history of the universality principle
can be gained by review of the following sources: Willard B. Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction
over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REV. 177 (1945); Thomas H. Sponsler, The Universality Principle of
Jurisdictionand the ThreatenedTrials ofAmerican Airmen, 15 LOY. L. REV. 43 (1968).
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This exercise of jurisdiction calls on judges to make some difficult
determinations: not only what is so universally hated that it should permit
universal jurisdiction, but also what is reasonable. 163 No stare decisis bright
lines exist to assist judges in this determination, nor is there a single express
64
treaty defining what are universal offenses.1
D. The "Reasonability"Requirement
Under the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
16
States, extraterritorially requires reasonability in the application of laws.
Factors listed by the Restatement (Third) for a court's consideration include:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state... ;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic
activity, between the regulating state and the person principally
responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and
those whom the regulation is designed to protect;

163. See supra note 162. The difficulty of these decisions has caused some scholars to suggest
everything from strict review under standards of due process to minimum contacts and forum non
conveniens. Other scholars argue that:
No fundamental distinction needs to be drawn between the jurisdictional problems raised
by litigation involving international elements arising in an American court... and those
raised by litigation in which the nonlocal elements are connected with sister states ....
[T]he relevant constitutional considerations seem equally applicable to the interstate and
the international case.
Arthur von Mebren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79
HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1122 (1966). For a more rigorous test of extraterritorial reasonableness, see
Randall, supranote 11,at 65-66. Professor Randall suggests that:
[J]udicial jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable in actions involving extraterritorial
torts only where one or more of the following minimum contacts exist: defendant is a
citizen or resident of the United States; defendant is an alien present, not just transitorily,
in the United States; defendant, if a corporation, is a U.S. corporation or foreign
corporation with "continuous and systemic" contacts in this country; defendant
committed an extraterritorial tort which had a direct or foreseeable effect in the United
States; and (perhaps) defendant has property in the United States.
Id. at 65. Of course this list is fairly exhaustive and as broad as any domestic due process minimum
contacts requirements. Are Professors Von Mehren and Trautman right? Are the standards for
international and interstate jurisdiction the same? This question is explored below in greater detail,
but, briefly, the answer is no. Presumptions against extraterritorial application of domestic law and
the original understanding of the Framers in passing the ATS suggest a far more limited scope.
164. Judges most often appear to look to customary international law, an amalgam of treaties,
principles ofjus cogens, and the facts of the case itself. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d
876, 880-84 (2d Cir. 1980).
165. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987).
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(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of
such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations...
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political,
legal, or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions
of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in
regulating the activity; and
66
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.1

Clearly, these factors provide a court with broad discretion with which
to extend or restrict the reach of American courts. 1 67 This is not in and of
itself a bad thing, as courts frequently do similar things with respect to
domestic application of personal jurisdiction. 68 What it does, however, is
force judges to make a determination, in the absence 1of
other jurisdictional
69
factors, of whether universal jurisdiction should apply.
Commentators disagree on not only the means by which universal
jurisdiction ought to be found, but also the extent to which it should be
166. Id. § 403(2).
167. See id, supra note 164 and accompanying text.
168. And while subject matter jurisdiction on its face appears a matter less of discretion than of
bright line rules (i.e., the diversity and $75,000 requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction), courts
are vested with discretionary powers of whether to exercise jurisdiction in cases of political question,
where justiciability matters arise (mootness, standing, etc.), and under such doctrines as forum non
conveniens. These forms of discretion are rarely, if ever, questioned. But see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Justiciabilityand Separationof Powers: A Neo-FederalistApproach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 44951, 497-511 (1996) (arguing that the Constitution creates a "natural presumption" favoring judicial
review of otherwise "political questions" that can only be rebutted by particular constitutional
provisions).
169. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987). Again, the types of

universal jurisdiction are territoriality, nationality, the protective principle, and the passive
personality principle. See supranote 151 and accompanying text.
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extended; no surprise given its fluidity and evolution.1 70 While the reach of
universality jurisdiction has expanded in definition, "every state remains free
to adopt principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction that it regards as best and
most suitable, provided
such jurisdiction does not overstep the limits of
171
international law."'
IV. (How) SHOULD THE ATS BE LIMITED?
To this point, this Article has explored the history of the ATS,' 72 the

manner in which it came into modem usage, 173 and some doctrines that
might have limiting implications for its use.174 Two things of great
importance are brought to light by this background: (i) the relatively narrow
scope in which the Founders saw the passage of the ATS, and (ii) the
enormous breadth given the ATS by United States courts who apply it
liberally. 175 The question we must ask is: are these propositions
in
177
harmony? 76 If they are not, the limits of the ATS must be determined.

170. Professor Randall argues for a minimum contact standard for the means and looks to past
treaties and customary international law for the extent. See supra note 163 and accompanying text;
see also, Randall, supra note 162, at 816-17. Contra Meron, supra note 147, at 21-22 (arguing that
hierarchies of moral structures are appropriate as a lex superior means of protecting human rights).
For a discussion of interesting implications of universal jurisdiction, see Leila Nadya Sadat,
Redefining Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 241, 262 (2001) (asking whether
"international law [should] establish some reasonable and principled rules to resolve otherwise
difficult conflicts ofjurisdiction"). Id. at 256.
171. Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: The United States and
European Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 1,3 (1992). Professor Alford notes one of the
most influential international law cases, S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) (No. 10), as expanding the
potential reach of extraterritoriality but providing individual nations with greater discretion:
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that states may not extend the
application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property and acts
outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is
only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules.
Id. at3.

172. See supra notes 2-62 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 65-148 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 149-171 and accompanying text. There are a host of other doctrines which
may limit the ATS but are outside the scope of this work. The curious reader is directed to the
following, admittedly not exhaustive, sources: Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (declining to infer a cause of action under the law of nations
where not explicitly given); Bradley & Goldsmith Ill, supra note 20; Aric K. Short, Is the Alien Tort
Statute Sacrosanct? Retaining Forum Non Conveniens in Human Rights Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 1001 (2001) (suggesting continued forum non conveniens limits for the ATS);
Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HASTINGS. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 445 (1995) (arguing for a more limited understanding of the phrase "tort only"); and
Teachout, supra note 78 (questioning whether the jurisdictional rules of customary international law
limit the Offenses Clause).
175. See supra Parts 11,
Ill.
176. For a scholar strongly in agreement with this statement, see Dodge, supra note 55, at 256.
Professor Dodge argues that Filartiga and its progeny are strongly in agreement with the original
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A.

PresumptionAgainst Extraterritorialityand the Alien Tort Statute

United States law has historically and routinely presumed against
extraterritorial application of United States statutes.' 78 Congress, of course,
is vested with express constitutional authority to expand the reach of statutes
beyond the borders of United States territory. 79 Much like the Charming
Betsy Doctrine,"8 the presumption against extraterritorial application of
United States law "serves to protect against unintended clashes between our
laws and those of other nations which could result in international
The Supreme Court assumes that unless there is an express
discord."''
provision to the contrary, "Congress legislates against the backdrop of the
presumption against extraterritoriality."' 2 Congress is assumed to have the
83
acumen to extend laws it passes beyond territorial borders if it so intends.

understanding of the Founders. See id. He asserts "overwhelming evidence that the First Congress
had a broad understanding of 'torts in violation of the law of nations' and enacted the Alien Tort
Clause to provide a civil remedy against any who would violate that law." Id. Of course, Professor
Dodge argues that the law of nations is an alterable body of law (it is) and, even though it has
evolved since 1781 (it has), the Founders had a far broader understanding of the law of nations than
Judge Bork allowed in Tel-Oren (they might have). Id. at 241. None of this, however, alters in the
least the limitations this Article suggests taking note of: extraterritoriality and the universality
principle.
177. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
178. See United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818) (holding that federal piracy
statute did not extend to a robbery committed on the high seas by foreign citizens on board a foreign
ship because of presumption against extraterritoriality). The Court reasoned that "general words"
covering the conduct of "any person" should not be construed to cover the actions of anyone,
anywhere. Id. at 631; see also McColloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372
U.S. 10, 19-22 (1963) (refusing to extend National Labor Relations Act extraterritorially).
179. See U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8; see also Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (stating
"that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States").
180. The Charming Betsy Doctrine states that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains." The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (emphasis added).
181. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
Arabian (or Aramco as it is called in the case), found Title VII of the Civil Rights Act inapplicable
extraterritorially. ld. at 249. Congress almost immediately overruled it by statute on slightly
different grounds, providing, in an amendment, that it was meant to have effect over United States
citizens and employees of United States companies, thus recognizing extraterritorial application of
Title VII in cases where an American is involved. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (2003). The rule of
presumption was not overruled, and in fact was reiterated by later Supreme Court cases. See, e.g.,
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
182. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248.
183. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989).

Thus, it is clear precedent that for any statute to be applied extraterritorially,
this intent must be so expressed in the statute itself.'84
1. Why No Serious Questioning of the ATS' Extraterritorial Nature?
No commentator has seriously considered limiting the ATS only
because of the presumption against extraterritoriality.' 85 Thus, the Filartiga
court incorrectly applied an English case over 200 years old while never
raising the presumption against extraterritoriality. 8 6 In all the ATS litigation

published since then, the question of whether the ATS may be applied
extraterritorially has not been raised by a court. 87 This may be because the
statute saw only extremely limited use until the latter part of the 20th
century. 88 Its use in Filartigabeing the penultimate modem expression of
the ATS, other courts may have assumed, since Congress and the Supreme
89
Court made no criticism of Filartigaapparent, that such was correct.

Since Filartigahas been cited by so many cases as the seminal ATS
case, perhaps other courts have not had occasion to question Filartiga's
conclusions. 190 It seemed clear to the Filartigacourt that since the statute
provided for jurisdiction over a tort committed against an alien in violation
of the law of nations, this must mean the violation could have occurred
outside United States territory.191
However, this understanding of the ATS does not comply with the
standards of extraterritoriality as espoused by the Supreme Court or with the
history and intent of the Framers who originally passed it.' 92

184. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
185. It would be impossible to list every permutation of article seeking to expand or limit the
ATS, but some of its principle "limiters" are Professors Bradley and Goldsmith. See Bradley &
Goldsmith II, supra note 20, at 330.
186. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). This point is discussed in detail
later.
187. A complete list of all published ATS litigation may be found at Appendix A. In only two
cases is the word "extraterritoriality" even used and in neither is it used in connection with the ATS.
See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 1994 WL 142006, at *5 (S.D. N.Y. Apr. 11, 1994) (touching on
extraterritoriality by statilng that "the local action doctrine does not lead to automatic dismissal of
any of plaintiffs' claims on the current record," but declining to expressly analyze extraterritoriality
of United States environmental laws); Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.
N.Y. 1991) (discussing extraterritoriality of RCRA).
188. Only one case utilized the statute prior to Filartiga in the 20th century. See Adra v. Clift,
195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961) (utilizing § 1350 as the basis for jurisdiction over custody suit
between aliens). Adra claimed falsifying a passport application was a violation of the law of nations
and, thus, is questionable at best as an illustration of current understanding of appropriate violations.
See id. at 865.
189. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
190. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
191. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887.
192. See infra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
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2.

Background to the ATS in the Extraterritorial Context

First, the history of the ATS's passage must be reexamined. 193 Although
the commentators and evidence each present a slightly different spin on the
rationale for the ATS, it can be said that providing a forum for foreign
plaintiffs in federal court was the primary purpose, with a concurrent intent
to enshrine a fledgling country With the mantle of legitimacy that comes
with protecting the international community. 194 Note once again the twin
cases of De Longchamps and the Dutch Ambassador affair.' 95 Both
certainly involved aliens suing for a tort. 196 Both occurred on American
soil.' 97 Obviously it would be overly basic to suggest the entire purpose of
the Alien Tort Statute was to satisfy the ire of two foreign dignitaries.' 98
But upon reexamination of other contemporaneous literature, the
reasoning for passage of the ATS seems no less geocentric.' 99 The primary
concern of the Federalists was a sole federal authority rather than the
individual (and often lacking) state interpretations of international law and
issues.' ° ° Protection of international human rights was never mentioned in
2
The Federalist.
"'
Scholars who would argue with this position might point not only to an
incident,0 2 but to the essential characteristics of the law of nations as
defined by Blackstone. 2 3 First, they might point to the Sierra Leone
incident,20 4 in which the French assaulted British holdings in Sierra Leone,
led by an American slave and with assistance from other Americans. 0 5
Then-Attorney General Bradford explained:

193. This summation is a simplified version of Part II(A) of this Article.
194. See supra notes 50-65 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 32-36, 40-44 and accompanying text.
196. See id. Of course, today it is unlikely these would be found as violations of the law of
nations if the principles had not been ambassadors.
197. See id.
198. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
199. The reader should once again refer to THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (John Jay), No. 42 (James
Madison), No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton). See also supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
200. See THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (John Jay), NO. 42 (James Madison), No. 80 (Alexander
Hamilton). Consider also the federalism concerns. See supra note 38.
201. Seeid.
202. See supranote 53 and accompanying text.
203. See supranotes 45-47.
204. See supranote 53 and accompanying text.
205. I Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795).

[T]here can be no doubt that the company or individuals who have
been injured by these acts of hostility have a remedy by a civil suit
in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being expressly given
to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for a tort only, in
violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of the United States;...
such a suit may be maintained by evidence taken at a
distance ....
26
Sierra Leone would almost certainly have been deemed an act of
piracy.20 7
Most compelling, however, is that while Attorney General
Bradford made the above statement with respect to the character of the
offense, he expressly refused to extend United States jurisdiction over the
action precisely because of the locus of the offense."'
3.

Filartiga's Extension of the ATS Conflicts with the Current
Supreme Court Understanding of Transitory Actions

Second, and far more complicated, commentators might point to the
existence of so-called "transitory" actions of the 18th century.20 9 Such
scholars might point to the example of Lord Mansfield's opinion in Mostyn
1 °
v. Fabrigas.
Mostyn is generally held to be the foundation for extending
state-jurisdiction over actions that arise in foreign states.2 , The Filartiga
court recognized this when it asserted, "Mostyn came into our law as the
original basis for state court jurisdiction over out-of-state torts, and it has not
lost its force in suits to recover for a wrongful death occurring upon foreign
soil, as long as the conduct complained of was unlawful where

206. Id. at 59.
207. See FYFE, supra note 53, at 59. As an act of piracy, a civil action would have been thought
advisable even with respect to an act committed outside United States territory in part because of
maritime and admiralty jurisdiction, and in part due to the concurrent and prevailing thought of
Blackstone that included piracy among the immutable violations of the law of nations. See
BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at 66-73.
208. I Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795). Professor Casto takes issue with this characterization,
claiming that "this aspect of the opinion is questionable." Casto, supra note 6, at 503 n.202. He so
asserts this apparently because of the "'home cookin' aspect of the case (the slaver/attacker being

American). See id. Whether Professor Casto's assertion is correct or not, the fact remains that at no
time surrounding the passage of the ATS was an actual ATS case applied extraterritorially.
209. See Casto, supra note 6, at 503.
210.
211.

98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B. 1774).
See McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. (I How.) 241, 248 (1843).

[I]f
A becomes indebted to B, or commits a tort upon his person or upon his personal
property in Paris, an action in either case may be maintained against A in England, if he
is there found ....[A]s to transitory actions, there is not a colour of doubt but that any
action which is transitory may be laid in any county in England, though the matter arises
beyond the seas.
Id.
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performed.

21 2

Filartigamisapplied Mostyn, however.2t 3 This is clear when

we turn to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the meaning of Mostyn:

As was well settled at English common law before our Republic
was founded, a nation's personal sovereignty over its own citizens
may support the exercise of civil jurisdiction in transitory actions
arising in places not subject to any sovereign ....

[I]t is clear that

the States also have ample power to exercise legislative jurisdiction
214
over the conduct of their own citizens abroad or on the high seas.
Transitory jurisdiction, as the Supreme Court has asserted throughout the
history of United States jurisprudence, exists to extend jurisdiction over
citizens of the forum state.215
Professor Casto also points, however, to the opinion of Judge Oliver
Ellsworth's Stoddard v. Bird.2t 6 The key thing to note about Stoddard is that
while Judge Ellsworth stated that the "[r]ight of action [for a tort arising in
New York] against an administrator is transitory, and the action may be

212. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citations omitted); see also Slater
v. Mexican Nat'l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120 (1904); Dennick v. R.R. Co., 103 U.S. 11 (1880);
McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. (I How.) 241, 248 (1843). Filartiga translated an 18th century English
court's understanding of transitory jurisdiction into a modem 20th century Second Circuit
understanding, while ignoring prior Supreme Court jurisprudence directing courts how to interpret
and use Mostyn and its principles.
213. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885. Essentially, Filartiga's assertion that the transitory principle "has
not lost its force in suits to recover for a wrongful death occurring upon foreign soil, as long as the
conduct complained of was unlawful where performed," id., should have been amended to read: was
unlawful where performed and caused by a citizen of the forum country. See infra notes 213-18 and
accompanying text.
214. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 212-13 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens referred not only to Mostyn but also to Dutton v. Howell, I Eng. Rep. 17, 21 (H.L. 1693).
Id. at 212 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens continued:
As Justice Holmes explained, "No doubt in regions subject to no sovereign, like the high
seas, or to no law that civilized countries would recognize as adequate, such [civilized
nations] may treat some relations between their citizens as governed by their own law,
and keep to some extent the old notion of personal sovereignty alive."
Id. (quoting Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909)). This also explains
why piracy (an action on the high seas) and even the Sierra Leone incident (an action involving a
citizen of the United States) would fall within the 18th century understanding of transitory actions
but not prove what so many commentators and the Filartigacourt hoped they did: extraterritoriality
of the ATS.
215. Id.
216. Casto, supra note 6, at 499-503. Stoddard involved a complicated estate and debt action,
which effectively resulted in a Connecticut resident being found and held in New York to be tried.
See id.

brought wherever he is found," all the events in question occurred within
United States territorial boundaries. 17

As the Supreme Court correctly noted in Smith, transitory actions have
always been used only within United States territory.218 Further support for
21 9
this unassailable position may be found in Moore's FederalPractice.
4.

The Torture Victim Protection Act

The passage of the TVPA also emphasizes the lack of extraterritoriality

in the ATS. 220 Reasoning for the passage of the TVPA included, first and
22' This was
foremost, the granting of a right to sue to United States citizens.222
because, by its plain terms, the ATS did not confer such a right.

217. See id.
218. Smith, 507 U.S. at 212-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Fulton, 261 F. Supp. 997, 999 (D. Colo. 1966) (citing I MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 142[2.-1], pp. 1455-56). The district court summed up Moore's position:
The difference between a transitory and a local action is not clear. It is said that local
actions are those which could have arisen in only a particular place whereas transitory
actions are those which could have arisen anywhere. Sometimes it is a matter of the
nature of the relief requested. Professor Moore maintains that the true distinction is in
terms of the character of the remedy sought. Thus, if the effort is to proceed against
property, the action is in rem and local; on the other hand, if it is a suit against the person,
it is transitory.
Id. at 999 (citations omitted); see also Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 Fed. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811)
(No. 8,411); Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021, 1029 (K.B. 1774).
220. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73.
221. See Short, supra note 174, at 1068. Mr. Short explains:
U.S. interests underlying the TVPA are much clearer, largely because legislative history
exists for that act. As explained in the House and Senate Judiciary Committee reports on
the TVPA, Congress felt the Act was necessary, despite the existence of the ATS, for a
variety of reasons: (1)to expand the class of plaintiffs that could bring suit for human
rights violations to include U.S. citizens; (2) to give special attention to the international
torts of official torture and summary execution; (3) to carry out the intent of the
Convention Against Torture; and (4) to make clear that Congress agreed with the broad
Filartiga interpretation of the ATS and rejected Judge Bork's narrow concurring opinion
in Tel-Oren.
Id.
222. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003). Since during the 18th century the First Congress would not have
considered transitory jurisdiction possible for aliens, but certainly Congress in passing the TVPA
realized providing United States citizens the right to sue might carry with it a transitory, prescriptive
jurisdiction, it is clear the ATS has not been afforded extraterritoriality. It is not clear whether
extraterritoriality ought to be found in the TVPA. Given the vast reference to foreign nations, to
exhaustion of remedies in the country "in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred," and
the already referenced reasons for passing the TVPA, it is likely Congress intended
extraterritoriality, but it is by no means certain. Considering that the Supreme Court has been
divided on the past three major extraterritoriality decisions (Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.,
509 U.S. 155 (1993); EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); and Smith v.United
States, 360 U.S. 1 (1959)), such an intention remains in doubt.
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5.

The Statute and Historical Presumption

The words of the ATS are terse and have been called everything from
vague to "a legal lohengrin. '223 But, they do not contain any indication the
statute was intended to be used beyond United States territory. 4 It could be
argued that the modem precept regarding a presumption against
extraterritoriality was not, and could not, have been in the contemplation of
the Framers upon passage of the ATS.225
Perhaps the earliest domestic case expounding upon the presumption
against extraterritoriality was State v. Carter.22 6 Carter refused to extend

223. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984); lIT v. Vencap,
Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
224. See§ 1350.
225. But what about the blatant reference to piracy and admiralty in Blackstone's Commentaries
and the U.S. Constitution? Don't these occur outside of United States territory? Surely Congress
must have intended these to be covered by the ATS.
The history and understanding of the "high seas" and admiralty jurisdiction is unique and somewhat
counterintuitive. Reduced to basic terms, jurisdiction over ships and persons on the high seas was
considered domestic jurisdiction by early United States courts. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 27 N.J.L.
499 (N.J. 1859). In Carter, the court noted:
[C]rimes may be committed on the high seas, in lands where there are, or where there are
not regular governments established. When done upon the high seas, they may be either
upon our vessels or upon vessels belonging to other governments. When done upon our
vessels, in whatever solitary comer of the ocean, from the necessity of the case, and by
universal acceptance, the vessel and all it contains is still within our jurisdiction, and
when the vessel comes to port the criminal is still tried for an act done within our
jurisdiction. But we have never treated acts done upon the vessels of other governments
as within our jurisdiction, nor has such ever been done by any civilized government.
Id. at 502.
Judge Bork noted that in the passage of the First Judiciary Act, the express grant of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction went to the district courts:
"Sec. 9. And be itfurther enacted, That the district courts shall have, exclusively of the
courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offences that shall be cognizable
under the authority of the United states, committed within their respective districts, or
upon the high seas."
Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 785 n.15 (Bork, J., concurring) (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1Stat. 73,
76-77 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003))). The First Congress granted an express
and limited extraterritorial authority to district courts over crimes on the high seas. See id. Thus,
insofar as prescriptive jurisdiction is concerned, the "high seas" are "defined" under the Offenses
Clause (per section 8 of Article I of the Constitution) as United States territory for the purposes of
district court jurisdiction, and therefore are a de facto United States nexus.
Thus, Congress could easily have contemplated actions arising out of maritime or admiralty
jurisdiction that fell within a non-extraterritorial ATS - they provided expressly for this contingency
by authorizing separate concurrent jurisdiction via section 9 of the Judiciary Act.
226. 27 N.J.L. 499 (N.J. 1859). The court in Carter did not address issues of transitory
jurisdiction expressly, but implicitly rejected them. Id. at 499-500. Judge Vredenburgh explained
that:

generalized jurisdiction over a criminal act even in just another state based
on a presumption against extraterritoriality. 227 Carter was a state court case
involving a manslaughter claim across the New Jersey-New York border,
and thus it did not factually involve questions of international law. 22' The
Carter court did, however, touch on crimes of general jurisdiction over
which the court thought it could extend jurisdiction extraterritorially without
express authority in the statute.229 More importantly, the United States
Supreme Court explicitly referred to Carter as support for its later
extraterritorial jurisprudence.23 °

If the acts charged in this indictment be criminal in New Jersey, it must be either by
force of some statute or upon general principles. There is no statute, unless it be the act to
be found in Nix. Dig. 184, § 3. But this evidently relates to murder only, and not to
manslaughter.
But I cannot make myself believe that the legislature, in that act, intended to embrace
cases where the injury was inflicted within a foreign jurisdiction, without any act done by
the defendant within our own. Such an enactment, upon general principles, would
necessarily be void; it would give the courts of this state jurisdiction over all the subjects
of all the governments of the earth, with power to try and punish them, if they could by
force or fraud get possession of their persons in all cases where personal injuries are
followed by death.
Id. at 501.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 502. The court explained:
[Some] crimes may be committed on the high seas, in lands where there are, or where
there are not regular governments established. When done upon the high seas, they may
be either upon our vessels or upon vessels belonging to other governments. When done
upon our vessels, in whatever solitary corner of the ocean, from the necessity of the case,
and by universal acceptance, the vessel and all it contains is still within our jurisdiction,
and when the vessel comes to port the criminal is still tried for an act done within our
jurisdiction. But we have never treated acts done upon the vessels of other governments
as within our jurisdiction, nor has such ever been done by any civilized government.
When an act malum in se is done in solitudes, upon land where there has not yet been
formally extended any supreme human power, it may be that any regular government
may feel, as it were, a divine commission to try and punish. It may, as in cases of crime
committed in the solitudes of the ocean, upon and by vessels belonging to no
government, pro hac vice arrogate to itself the prerogative of omnipotence, and hang the
pirate of the land as well as of the water. Further than this it could not have been intended
that our statute should apply.
See id. at 502.
230. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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The first such case was American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.23 1 In
American Banana, the Court reviewed the complaint of a corporation with
operations based in Costa Rica232 against a domestic company for alleged
violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.233 The Supreme Court espoused

for the first time in plain language the presumption against extraterritoriality
in federal law: "All legislation is prima facie territorial. 234 The Supreme
Court refused to extend extraterritorial application over acts committed in

Costa Rica, even where the actor was a United States corporation to23which
5

the Court admitted the Sherman Antitrust Act would otherwise apply.
Emphasizing the accepted statute of the presumption doctrine, the
Supreme Court applied a domestic statute extraterritorially in Blackmer v.
United States.23 6 Blackmer considered the case of an American citizen

living in Paris, France, and his refusal to answer subpoenas issued him by
the courts of the District of Columbia. 237

The Court found that because

231. Id. American Banana Co. was later overturned on other grounds, but continued to be cited
for its propositions regarding extraterritorial application of domestic law. See Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421, 437-38 (1932). Contemporaneous with these domestic decisions, the seminal
international case of S.S. Lotus suggested similar precepts: "Now the first and foremost restriction
imposed by international law upon a state is that - failing the existence of a permissive rule to the
contrary - it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State." S.S. Lotus,
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10.
232. The corporation was organized in New Jersey, however. See American Banana Co., 213
U.S. at 354.
233. See id. at 353-54.
234. Id. at 357. The Court continues:
Words having universal scope, such as "every contract in restraint of trade," "every
person who shall monopolize," etc., will be taken as a matter of course to mean only
every one subject to such legislation, not all that the legislator subsequently may be able
to catch. In the case of the present statute, the improbability of the United States
attempting to make acts done in Panama or Costa Rica criminal is obvious, yet the law
begins by making criminal the acts for which it gives a right to sue.
Id.
235. See id. The Court explained, however, that it felt the actions in Costa Rica would not
otherwise be subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act, but this does not alter the Court's extraterritorial
analysis:
We think it entirely plain that what the defendant did in Panama or Costa Rica is not
within the scope of the statute so far as the present suit is concerned. Other objections of
a serious nature are urged but need not be discussed.
For again, not only were the acts of the defendant in Panama or Costa Rica not within
the Sherman act, but they were not torts by the law of the place and therefore were not
torts at all, however contrary to the ethical and economic postulates of that statute.
Id.
236. 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
237. Id. at 433. Blackmer is most often cited for its law concerning citizens, allegiance, and due
process. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 319 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1963).
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Blackmer remained a citizen of the United States, discovery statutes
requiring his response maintained the ability to exercise jurisdiction over
him. 238 The Court recognized the presumption against extraterritoriality,
however, when it stated:
While the legislation of the Congress, unless the contrary intent
appears, is construed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States, the question of its application, so far as citizens
of the United States in foreign countries are concerned, is one of
construction, not of legislative power.239

Such ruling was one of the primary sources in Filardo,240 discussed
previously, and brings this Article full circle back to the modem
presumption against the extraterritoriality doctrine of Arabian American Oil
and Smith v. United States.24'

6. The Background Combined with the Language and Presumption
Leave No Doubt the ATS Was Not Intended to Be
Extraterritorially Applied
242
Congress did not intend the ATS to be applied extraterritorially.

Although the modem concept of presumption against extraterritoriality has

only been expressed in these terms during the last century,243 the concept and
reasoning behind this presumption have remained ingrained in American
jurisprudence and policy since the Founders passed the ATS.244 Given this
background, it is likely that if Congress had meant to impart extraterritorial

238. Id. at 434-39. No express mention of "transitory" jurisdiction is made, suggesting its use
had, by this point in American jurisprudence, fallen out of common usage, although this is precisely
the situation discussed by Mostyn.
239. Id. at 436-37. The Court explained why jurisdiction was proper, however:
By virtue of the obligations of citizenship, the United States retained its authority over
him, and he was bound by its laws made applicable to him in a foreign country. Thus,
although resident abroad the petitioner remained subject to the taxing power of the
United States. For disobedience to its laws through conduct abroad he was subject to
punishment in the courts of the United States. With respect to such an exercise of
authority, there is no question of international law, but solely of the purport of the
municipal law which establishes the duties of the citizen in relation to his own
government.
Id. (citations omitted).
240. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949).
241. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 186-245 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., Filardo, 336 U.S. at 285.
244. See, e.g., McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. (I How.) 241, 248 (1843) (Supreme Court's
interpretation of Mostyn).
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application of the ATS upon its passage, it would have done so. 245 Since
even if the language of the statute was ambiguous in this regard (it is not),
the presumption would be in favor of not applying the statute
extraterritorially, and such must be the conclusion reached.246
Understanding the ATS in light of the manner in which transitory
jurisdiction was understood in the 18th century, how it remains viewed by
the Supreme Court, and Congress' most recent expression on a similar topic
all demonstrate why Congress did not intend the ATS to be applied
247
extraterritorially.
B.

UniversalJurisdiction:A "Case Study" in Why ExtraterritorialityIs
248

Inappropriate

What is jurisdiction? 249 First, it is the power of a court to assert
authority over legal interests. 50 This power is only extended in cases absent
a nexus with the forum state where the acts of the defendant have been
alleged to be so egregious that they fall within a universally hated sphere of
wrongs.25' This is universal jurisdiction.252 These limits may be extended or

245. § 1350 contains no such mention.
246. This is the nature of a presumption. Without an express provision to the contrary, the
presumption must be adopted. What this means for the ATS is discussed in Part V.
247. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991). The ramifications of this
conclusion are discussed in Part V.
248. This Article does not address theforum non conveniens concern. While this issue has strong
supporters arguing both for its application and against it, such is outside the scope of this Article.
For a compelling discussion of this issue, compare Short, supra note 174, with Kathryn Lee Boyd,
The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non Conveniens in U.S. Human Rights Litigation,
39 VA. J. INT'L L. 41,49-51 (1998).
249. See Randall, supranote 162, at 786.
250. See id.
251. See id. at 791-819, 834-37.
252.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987).

The universality

principle is explained briefly in notes 160 to 164. At this juncture, a careful reader will note some
intersection between the prior issue (extraterritoriality) and the current (universality).
A juxtaposition of these two issues (extraterritoriality in general and universal jurisdiction) may be
confusing - the first involves the power of a court to extend a domestic statute over territory not of
the United States; the second involves the power of a court to extend its jurisdiction over a party
with no connection to the United States. See supranotes 162, 171 and accompanying text. These are
distinct issues. The point at which they intersect is unclear and not often addressed by courts or
scholars. The confusion may be illustrated by the following hypothetical example:
Consider the case of Domestic Statute A, Corporation B, and Individual C. Corporation B is a
British Corporation with operations in India. Individual C is an Indian citizen. Domestic Statute A
provides stiff penalties for any corporation doing business in the United States that bribes local
officials of foreign countries to better situate their business position (such as the Foreign Corrupt
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constricted in accordance with a nation's domestic law.253 These limits may
be expanded or constricted by international law such as treaties. 4 They are,
of course, subject to the doctrine ofjus cogens 5 For a United States court
to seek reliance upon universal jurisdiction, the case or controversy, by
definition, cannot include any United States "nexus. 256 Thus, United States
courts are making determinations of their own jurisdiction over foreigners
with potentially no connection to the United States other than having an
United States lawyer.257
To determine how far the universality principle should be applied in
light of the ATS and what this means for the ATS' extraterritorial
application, it is helpful to survey the principle sources and users of the
doctrine.258
1. The Restatement Approach
Earlier in this Article, it was explained that universal jurisdiction derives
from offenses considered so terrible that they are an evil against all of
humanity. 259
Commentators and courts all use different precise
Practices Act). If Individual C sues Corporation B in a United States court, first the individual needs
to show that the court has power to hear the dispute. The court must determine if one of the
traditional five types of prescriptive jurisdiction exists. The court quickly notes that the action does
not occur within U.S. territory and no U.S. nationals are involved. The passivity principle does not
apply since no U.S. citizen is being harmed. United States military/protective interests are not
implicated, but there may be a question of fact as to whether there are actual effects within the
United States. The universality principle (discussed at length below) only applies if the alleged
violation is so egregious that the actor is considered an enemy of humanity. Let us assume (for now)
such does not exist here. Thus, the court must determine whether direct effects occur within the
United States. See id. § 402. The court must also determine that the exercise of jurisdiction would
be reasonable. See id. § 403. Then, and only then, can the court determine if Domestic Statute A
even applies extraterritorially - but the court must bear in mind the analysis it performed in
extending prescriptive jurisdiction in the first place to ensure these analyses are consistent since they
likely involve some of the same arguments and facts. It is possible to find jurisdiction based on the
protective principle, for example, but no extraterritoriality, since such need not come hand-in-hand;
it is difficult, however, to find prescriptive jurisdiction based on the nationality principle (that the
actor is a national of the forum state) without extending extraterritoriality under United States law,
given the pronouncement of Blackmer and its progeny. (Of course, this is what happened in the
American Banana case). Thus, the reader is cautioned for the purposes of this analysis to be wary of
places where these issues intersect and treat them separately, but consistently.
253. See Alford, supra note 171, at 3.
254. See Randall, supra note 162, at 815-18.
255. See Joanna E. Arlow, Note, The Utility of ATCA and the "Law of Nations" in Environmental
Torts Litigation: Jota v. Texaco, Inc. and Large Scale Environmental Destruction, 7 WIS. ENVTL.
L.J. 93, 108-09 (2000).
256. See Randall, supra note 162, at 785.
257. See supra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
259. See generally Randall, supra note 162, at 785. Universal jurisdiction may comfortably be
split into two inquiries: the meaning of "universal," and the meaning of "jurisdiction." It is primarily
the first question with which this Article is concerned. For a discussion of the second, see Sadat,
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terminology, 260 but the gist is that "[a] state has jurisdiction to define2 61 and
prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of
nations as of universal concern ....

,

The Restatement lists seven primary

offenses that fall within this list: "piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking
of aircraft, genocide, war crimes and perhaps certain acts of terrorism. 263
The reason these offenses ostensibly are given higher status within the
264
international community is that they are crimes "of all mankind.,
Commentators have phrased the rationale "to bring perpetrators of the most
heinous international crimes to justice. 265 The primary issue with the
Restatement appears
to be that the violation is of "mutual" concern to the
266
world community.
2.

Jus Cogens and Customary International Law

Not only the definitions, but also the character of these crimes bear

striking similarities, if not a veritable mirror image, to the prohibitions found
under the doctrine ofjus cogens.267 Jus cogens is a doctrine of international

law that addresses unconscionability, any sanctioned genocide, slavery,
extrajudicial killing, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial
discrimination, and consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights and will cancel all agreements or other laws of
international character to the contrary. 268 The similarities between what has

supra note 170, at 245-55.
260. And this may be part of the problem.
261. The "define" portion of section 404 of the Restatement (Third) is an enigma within the
section itself, but also arguably conflicts with the United States Constitution, Article I, section 8.
This must remain a discussion for another day.
262. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987).
263. Id.
264. Jon B. Jordan, Universal Jurisdiction in a Dangerous World: A Weapon for All Nations
Against InternationalCrime, 9 MICH. ST. U.- DCL J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (2000).
265. Johan D. van der Vyver, American Exceptionalism: Human Rights, International Criminal
Justice, andNational Self-Righteousness, 50 EMORY L.J. 775, 776 (2001).
266. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980) (interpreting the Restatement).
267. See Princz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Princz
court phrased this conjunction of ideas:
Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, for certain offenses (including, but not
limited to, jus cogens violations) a state can exercise jurisdiction over an offender in
custody even if that state has neither a territorial link to the offense nor any connection to
the nationality of the victim or offender.
Id. at 1182 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 cmt. a, reporter's n.1
(1987)).
268. See Meron, supranote 147, at 14.

thus far been addressed as "customary international law" by numerous
scholars, the Filartiga and Tel-Oren courts, and that list of jus cogens

violations are striking, albeit less mirror-imaged than that ofjus cogens and
the universality prohibitions.269

3. Filartiga's Concept of Prescriptive Jurisdiction
Are violations of customary international law alone enough to justify
application of universal jurisdiction?27 ° This question may seem simply
answered, emphatically even, by a resounding "no," given the language of
the Restatement, but the Filartigacourt seemed to think otherwise:
Judge Friendly astutely noted that the mere fact that every nation's

municipal law may prohibit theft does not incorporate "the Eighth
Commandment, 'Thou Shalt not steal' ... [into] the law of nations."

It is only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the
wrong is of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of
express international accords, that a wrong generally recognized
becomes an international law violation within the meaning of the
statute.27'
According to Filartiga,the law of
nations includes violations of "mutual"
2 72
community.
world
the
to
concern
According to this reasoning, the best place to go to look for a definition
of these "universally offensive" acts would be customary international
law.273 Logically, then, any offense against customary international law
should be subject to universaljurisdiction.274 If the universality principle

269. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987).

The Restatement

provides a list of violations over which universal jurisdiction may be made, but is this list
exhaustive? Many scholars argue not. See, e.g., Arlow, supra note 255, at 108-09; Susan Jenkins
Vanderweert, Comment, Seeking Justice for "Comfort" Women: Without an International Criminal
Court. Suits Brought by World War H Sex Slaves of the Japanese Army May Find Their Best Hope of
Success in U.S. Federal Courts, 27 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 141 (2001). Conversely, should
the list be expanded at all? Not without express pronouncement from Congress under its power to
"define... the law of nations." U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8.
270. Contrary to the Filartiga assertion, to violate customary international law does not require a
crime of great moral turpitude. The Marbois affair, see supra note 34 and accompanying text,
illustrates this: clearly such occurrence was in the minds of the Framers upon the ATS' passage, and
there is no doubt among the current scholarship that offenses against ambassadors qualified as a
violation of the law of nations, yet such has never been granted the "heinous" status other crimes
against humanity are given in order to provide for prescriptive universal jurisdiction.
271. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888.
272. Id.
273. See id.
274. See id. The Filartiga court seemed to suggest this when it asserted:
It is not extraordinary for a court to adjudicate a tort claim arising outside of its territorial
jurisdiction. A state or nation has a legitimate interest in the orderly resolution of disputes
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only applies to crimes so heinous that it is more restrictive than the
definition of customary international law, the question arises: what are acts
that violate 275the law of nations that are not covered by universal

jurisdiction?

4. How Courts Since Filartiga Have Used Universality
A brief survey of how other courts since Filartiga have applied the
universality principle is in order. 7 Primary among the ATS case law is TelOren.277 In Tel-Oren, Judge Edwards concluded that universal jurisdiction

would be proper for piracy or other like-considered crimes.27 Thus, Judge
Edwards would have found universal jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims
in Tel-Oren but for the plaintiffs' inability to "point to a right to sue in
international law.

279

Next in importance is Kadic v. Karadzic. 8° In Kadic, the court held that

among those within its borders, and where the lex loci delicti commissi is applied, it is an
expression of comity to give effect to the laws of the state where the wrong occurred.
Id. at 885.
275. In fact, Filartiga never uses the phrase "universal jurisdiction." See generally id. Instead,
the court in Filartiga based jurisdiction on a complicated state-jurisdiction analogy. See id.
at 88587. Given the facts of Filartiga, there could not have been any other kind of prescriptive jurisdiction
than universal.
276. Filartiga was decided in 1980. Since then, over 1000 rulings have been issued in ATSrelated cases in federal court. A complete list of ATS-related cases may be found at Appendix A.
277. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring). Judge Edwards gives the best review of universality in Tel-Oren, and, thus, this portion
of the Article focuses on his concurrence.
278. Id. Judge Edwards asserted:
Judge Kaufman characterized the torturer in Filartiga as follows: "Indeed, for purposes
of civil liability, the torturer has become - like the pirate and slave trader before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind." The reference to piracy and slavetrading is not fortuitous. Historically these offenses held a special place in the law of
nations: their perpetrators, dubbed enemies of all mankind, were susceptible to
prosecution by any nation capturing them.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890). One writer explained it this way:
Before International Law in the modem sense of the term was in existence, a pirate was
already considered an outlaw, a "hostis humani generis." According to the Law of
Nations the act of piracy makes the pirate lose the protection of his home State, and
thereby his national character.... Piracy is a so-called "international crime"; the pirate is
considered the enemy of every State, and can be brought to justice anywhere.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 272, 609 (8th ed.
1955)); see also OPPENHEIM, supra, § 151, 339 (each state may punish piracy, slave trade on capture
of the criminal, or other similar crimes, whatever the nationality of the perpetrator).
279. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 779 n.5 (Edwards, J., concurring)
280. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
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subject matter jurisdiction did exist, and implicitly adopted the Filartiga
rationale that as long as the offenses were against the law of nations,
extraterritorial power could be exercised over the defendants.28' Other
courts have held similarly, never seeming to question the application of

extraterritoriality via the universality principle once the offenses to the law
of nations were either admitted or denied.282

5. What Does Universal Jurisdiction Exist to Do?
First, what universal jurisdiction does not exist to do should be noted.283
It does not exist to duplicate other kinds of prescriptive jurisdiction.2 84 The
four other prescriptive jurisdictions are territoriality, nationality, the
protective principle, and passive personality. 285 These types of jurisdiction
each require a United States "nexus," unlike universality. 28 6 Universality is
called for only when one of the other types of prescriptive jurisdiction is
lacking.2 87 Thus, it permits something no other kind of jurisdiction (either
international or domestic) permits - jurisdiction over a case in which the
parties and locus potentially have absolutely no connection to the forum

281. See id. at 241. The court explained:
Though the immediate focus of section 404 is to identify those offenses for which a state
has jurisdiction to punish without regard to territoriality or the nationality of the
offenders, the inclusion of piracy and slave trade from an earlier era and aircraft hijacking
from the modem era demonstrates that the offenses of "universal concern" include those
capable of being committed by non-state actors. Although the jurisdiction authorized by
section 404 is usually exercised by application of criminal law, international law also
permits states to establish appropriate civil remedies, such as the tort actions authorized
by the Alien Tort Act.
Id. at 240 (citations omitted).
282. See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2001) (failing
to reach question of whether kidnapping violates jus cogens norm and thereby the law of nations
under the ATS but never questioning universal principle); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d
534, 552-53 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) (holding environmental suit did not sufficiently allege violation of
customary international law andforum non conveniens would be applicable anyway); Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 890 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (quoting Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493, 500 (9th
Cir. 1992), for the proposition that "jurisdiction may be based on a violation 'of a jus cogens norm
which enjoys the highest status within international law'). Query: is forum non conveniens merely
a tool for courts to avoid extraterritorial application of the ATS? If the ATS was intended to provide
a forum in federal court for aliens, and the federal court can transfer or dismiss an action based on
the inconvenient forum doctrine, are the courts being true to the statute?; See also Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff failed to allege
violations sufficient to be counted among "customary usage and clearly articulated principles of the
international community").
283.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987).

284.
285.
286.
287.

See id. §§ 402, 404.
See id.
See Alford, supra note 171,at 19.
See Randall, supra note 162, at 788-89.
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state.2 88
The universality principle exists to permit states to exercise jurisdiction
over acts so egregious they dare not let such acts go unpunished28 9 - acts
where the forum state as a member of the international community feels as a
matter of justice that such should not go unpunished - and it otherwise
would.29 ° Sometimes this may be used in conjunction with the ATS to grant
to hear the claim of an alien with no other means of
a court jurisdiction
29 1
recourse.

C. The Universality Principleand the A TS

The universality principle must be applied narrowly and with great care,
'
if it is to be applied at all. 292 A well-meaning scholar might ask, "why?" 293
Many of the reasons have already been discussed, but one primary concern
(and that raised by Judge Robb in Tel-Oren) 94 is the political question
doctrine.295

288. Thus, eliminating forum non conveniens as Professor Boyd suggests would create a vehicle
for litigation where there is no more connection or reason for the parties to find themselves in an
American court other than that they want to. See Boyd, supra note 248, at 49-5 1; supra note 282
and accompanying text. A more detailed and eloquent defense of forum non conveniens in human
rights litigation may be found in Short, supra note 174.
289. See Randall, supra note 162, at 790.
290. Id. at 838-39.
291. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (granting jurisdiction over one
alien's claim against another with no other form of prescriptive jurisdiction than the universality
principle).
292. The Restatement appears to comport with this suggestion. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987). Remember also that we are still reviewing the doctrine of
extraterritoriality within the microcosm of universal jurisdiction. The presumption still applies in
cases of the universality principle!
293. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 248, at 49-51 (arguing forum non conveniens should be
inapplicable in human rights litigation because common law doctrine is trumped by legislative intent
to provide forum).
294. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robb, J.,
concurring). Note that the executive branch has issued directives regarding the ATS. See Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The Executive Branch has emphatically restated in
this litigation its position that private persons may be found liable under the Alien Tort Act for acts
of genocide, war crimes, and other violations of international humanitarian law."). Such a
pronouncement does not always make it easier for courts to apply statutes and doctrines, however.
See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949) (discussing the
Bernstein exception, which possibly permits evidence of the state department's thoughts on foreign
affairs issues in federal court); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 469
(1964) (White, J., Dissenting) ("[A]n official stand is what the Department must take under the socalled Bernstein exception, which the Court declines to disapprove.").
295. See Henkin, supra note 9, at 144. "That there is a 'political question' doctrine is not

1. The Political Question Doctrine
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence has shaped and defined the political
question doctrine starting with the seminal case of Marbury v. Madison.296
Chief Justice Marshall noted in Marbury that while it is the province of the
courts to "say what the law is," there are some acts of government not
subject to "[examination] in a court of justice.297 Since Marbury, the Court
has used the doctrine sparingly, but consistently, in the area of foreign
relations.298 Foreign relations have routinely been subject to the use of the
political question doctrine. 99
The Supreme Court explained in Baker v. Carr that it is the
responsibility of courts to make the determination of whether an issue has
been committed to another branch of the government. "Deciding whether a
matter has ... been committed by the Constitution to another branch ... is
itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and [the
responsibility of the Supreme] Court as ultimate interpreter of the
300
Constitution.'
Baker provided future courts with a list of six factors to use to determine
the justiciability of a potential political question. 3° ' Political questions are
characterized by:
[I] a commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards

disputed, but there is little agreement as to anything else about it .
I..."
Id. The political question
doctrine is not without controversy in and of itself, but the majority of commentators and courts have
recognized its validity and need since Baker v. Carr. For a contrary view on the propriety of the
political question doctrine, see Pushaw, Jr., supra note 168.
296. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 165 (1803).
297. Id. at 177.
298. See, e.g., Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1853) (holding that ratification by foreign
government is a political question); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829) (determining that
a territorial boundary dispute is a political question); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.)
610 (1818) (recognizing that establishing formal relations with a new foreign government is a
political question).
299. Foreign affairs are a primary aspect of national power expressly delegated by the
Constitution to Congress and the Executive. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cf. 2, 3 (granting the
President the power to approve and make treaties with advice and consent of the Senate and to
appoint and receive ambassadors); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. II (congressional power to declare
war). Clearly, judicial power extends over some international issues, but some scholars point out the
extremely limited extent of this power. See Bradley & Goldsmith II, supra note 20, at 330 (arguing
the political branches of the executive and the legislative have already, or ought to, have more
control over international litigation than courts currently recognize).
300. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). The Baker Court explained that "resolution of
[foreign relations] issues frequently turn on standards that defy judicial application, or involve the
exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature; but many such
questions uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Government's views." Id.
301. Id.at217.
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for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6]
from
multifarious
of
embarrassment
potentiality
the
pronouncements by various departments on one question.30 2
Judge Robb explained why he thought the question presented in the
ATS context in Tel-Oren was a political question:
Even more problematic would be the single court's search for
individual responsibility for any given terrorist outrage.
International terrorism consists of a web that the courts are not
positioned to unweave. To attempt to discover the reach of its
network and the origins of its design may result in unintended
disclosures imperiling sensitive diplomacy. 3
And later:
But cases which would demand close scrutiny of terrorist acts are
far beyond these limited exceptions to the traditional judicial
reticence displayed in the face of foreign affairs cases. That
traditional deference to the other branches has stemmed, in large
part, from a fear of undue interference in the affairs of state, not

302. id. The significance of the "or" language in the Court's jurisprudence indicates courts'
deference to any of these characteristics. The multi-factor test of Baker was reduced to three
primary inquiries in Justice Powell's oft-quoted concurrence in Goldwater v. Carter: "(i) Does the
issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate
branch of government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond
areas of judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention?"
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). Arguably, Justice Powell's
second two summations of the Baker characteristics apply to many ATS litigations. See Oetjen v.
Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (characterizing foreign relations as a political question
and noting that "the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision"); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 455 (1939) (finding that
the conduct of foreign relations often involves "'considerations of policy ...[that render a court]
entirely incompetent to [its] examination and decision"') (quoting Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
199, 260 n.31 (1796)).
303. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robb, J.,
concurring).
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only of this nation but of all nations.

°4

Judge Robb's cautions are paramount, and must be taken seriously, if not
adopted. 0 5

2. The Historical Context of the ATS and Its Current Usage Are in
Contradiction

Another reason the universality principle must be applied narrowly and
with great care concerns the complexity of its exercise and contradictory
nature.30 6 The ATS was passed to "protect against the vagaries of state law,

the hostility of state courts, and differences in their interpretations of the law
of nations, sparing the new nation ... embarrassment. 3

7

The Framers realized that the law of nations would be a flexible body of
law, and provided for this by granting Congress the power to define the law
of nations.30 6 Additionally, under The PaqueteHabana,Courts may seek and
find the law of nations by consulting numerous sources. 30 9 But can the

courts, absent express authority from Congress, also use universal
jurisdiction?3" 0

We return again to Blackstone.3"'

Blackstone being one of the

preeminent authorities of the time, it is almost certainly true that the
Founders relied on his Commentaries.312 Such suggested both that there are

304. Id. at 825 (Robb, J., concurring).
305. It is recommended the reader read the entirety of Judge Robb's well-reasoned opinion. See
id. at 823-27 (Robb, J., concurring). Note especially his assertion:
We are here confronted with the easiest case and thus the most difficult to resist. It was a
similar magnet that drew the Second Circuit into its unfortunate position in Filartiga.
But not all cases of this type will be so easy. Indeed, most would be far less attractive.
The victims of international violence perpetrated by terrorists are spread across the globe.
It is not implausible that every alleged victim of violence of the counter-revolutionaries
in such places as Nicaragua and Afghanistan could argue just as compellingly as the
plaintiffs here do, that they are entitled to their day in the courts of the United States.
Id. at 826 (Robb, J., concurring).
306. See inqfa notes 307-46.
307. Dodge, supra note 55, at 237.
308. See U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8; see also Jarvis, supra note 136.
309. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). Arguably, however, this power overreaches
constitutional authority of the courts. At least two scholars have commented on this possibility. See,
e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the
Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEo. L.J. 479 (1998) (reexamining the modem
international application of the Charming Betsy Doctrine in light of separation of powers concerns);
Donald J. Kochan, Note, Constitutional Structure as a Limitation on the Scope of the "Law of
Nations" in the Alien Tort Claims Act, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 153 (1998) (arguing that separation of
powers concerns limit application of the ATCA under the Offenses Clause).
310. No.
311. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
312. See generally Casto, supra note 6, at 489 n. 117 ("In view of Blackstone's general influence
upon eighteenth century American attorneys, it would be surprising if the drafters of the Judiciary
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some particular crimes against the law of nations, and that there are other,
non-"principal" offenses as well. 3 3 Likely, these non-principal offenses
would be4 lesser charges, or Blackstone would have enumerated them more
clearly.

31

Following Blackstone's suggestions, the Continental Congress
enumerated essentially the same three offenses in defining the law of
nations: "safe-conducts ...
[,] infractions of the
ambassadors ... [,]" and "infractions of treaties.,, 3 '5

immunities of
Together with

Blackstone's principal offenses, this language indicates the types of
infractions considered by the authors of the Judiciary Act and ATS.
It must be asked: were genocide, war crimes, terrorism, and the like
unknown at the time? 316 Clearly they were not.3 17 Why then, were these
crimes by "hostis humani generis' 3 18 not enumerated in the literature of the

time? 31 9 The answer is deceptively simple and was alluded to previously.32 °

These crimes are so great that they are an affront to nations; the means for a
nation to respond to such crimes is not civil litigation but war!32'
The Founders could not have intended that the ATS give rise to
litigation to cover such massive tragedies for which it is used today.322 The

Founders, in passing the ATS, provided a civil remedy for individuals who

Act did not rely upon the Commentaries."); Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New
American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 731 (1976).
313.

BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at 67-68.

314. See id.
315. 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

1136-37 (1781).

Note this was the

Continental Congress and not the First Congress of the United States; but the continuity of legal
expression is assured.
316. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987).
317. See, e.g., VATTEL, supra note 128, at 114 § 4. Vattel points to "disaster and ruin"

confronting states and what amounts to genocide. See id. at 141 § 90 ("It is not lawful to drive a
nation from the country it inhabits.").
318. This means: "An enemy of all mankind."
319. No mention of any of the universality principle prohibitions is found in any scholar's
historical analysis or commentary of the time.
320. See supranotes 128-33 and accompanying text.
321. See VATTEL, supra note 128, at 130 § 53 ("The principles involved in the three preceding
propositions [of the right of self-protection, the right of resistance, and the right of redress] constitute
the several grounds upon which a just war may be waged .... ").
322. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). Kadic alleged acts of brutal mass
rape, torture, genocide, infanticide, war crimes, and other vast, immeasurable evils. Id. at 236.
While this Article acknowledges the United States military acted too late to save many victims of
these atrocities, it is highly improbable that either the threat, or reality, of United States litigation
curbed any of these depraved acts.

had been affronted by other individuals, 323 not as an equivalent or even
alternative to the use of military force.324 The terrible tragedies confronting
the 21st century international community at the Framers' time would have
Matters of genocide and war
been seen as acts of war against a nation.
crimes are matters for military tribunals. 326 Issues of systemic racial
discrimination are matters for intense political pressure and sanctions.327
The best example of the political principle in action is the tragedy
related by the Flatow case. 28 In Flatow, terrorists caused an explosion on a
bus in Israel, killing several Israeli soldiers and one American citizen. 329 The
American was Alisa Flatow, an undergraduate student at Brandeis
University. 330 Her father brought a wrongful death action under the statesponsored terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

("FSIA"). 3 While previously the FSIA had negated suits against statesponsored activities, following the Flatow tragedy (but prior to the lawsuit),
an amendment to the FSIA was enacted that abrogated immunity from suit

where:
foreign states [are] officially designated by the Department of State
as terrorist states if the foreign state commits a terrorist act, or

provides material support and resources to an individual or entity
which commits such an act, which results in the death or personal
injury of a United States citizen.332

The court held ]ran liable 333 under the FSIA and awarded over $225 million
323. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
324. See I Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1795).
325. It should be noted that there is a commensurate doctrine applicable to actions against foreign
nations: the Act of State Doctrine, which says U.S. courts will not examine the propriety of the act of
a foreign nation without an exception. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401
(1964).
326. The U.N. Tribunals Prosecuting War Crjminals from Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia
are Making Histoty - and Blazing a Trail, CBC NEWS ONLINE, at http://cbc.ca/news/indepth/
warcrimes/ (describing war crimes tribunals in general and specifically the Yugoslav War Crimes
Tribunal).
327. See. e.g., Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151, 2346(d), 5001-16
(Supp. IV 1986). So would have thought the Framers and so should we interpret the ATS today."
328. Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1,7-10 (D. D.C. 1998).
329. Id. at 7.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 9-10; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (2003). While this action was not brought under
the ATS, the governmental response to the crises is a good illustration of how Congress is not only
capable, but willing, to "fix" statutes that do not comport with its goal of terrorism interdiction.
332. Flatow, 999 F. Supp. at 12 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (1997)). It is interesting to note
that here Congress expressly reserved this cause of action for U.S. citizens - not aliens. What this
means for terrorism as a cause of action under the ATS for aliens presents an interesting question.
333. Id. at 5-6. Iran never made an appearance in the suit and, thus, was subject to a default
judgment. Id. at 6 n. 1.
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in punitive damages.334 The Flatow case presents a perfect example of the
political process picking up where the judicial process should never have
been.335

The acts complained of by the vast majority of ATS litigants are of such
great evil character that they are not affronts against a person by a person,
they are affronts against a nation by a nation.336 As Vattel wisely pointed
out:
Whoever ill-treats a citizen indirectly injures the State, which must
protect that citizen ....

If a sovereign who has the power to see that

his subjects act in a just and peaceable manner permits them to
injure a foreign Nation, either the State itself or its citizens, he does
no less a wrong to that Nation than if he injured it himself ....

[I]n

place of the friendly intercourse which nature intends should exist
among men we shall have nothing better than a dreadful state of
international anarchy.337
Some may say this wisdom is antiquated and of no use today. 338

Those

people need only direct their thoughts to the language and character of the
recent war on terrorism to see that attacks on individuals by individuals still
implicate nations and war.339

Others would argue that the law of nations was intended as a flexible
doctrine and its current understanding supercedes the Founders'; indeed,
such was even their aim. 340 This may especially be true of commentators
arguing for an expanded view of the law of nations to confront, for example,
environmental torts.34' Yet these arguments do not, and cannot, alter intent
of the statute as it was passed,342 nor the propriety of courts in refraining
334. Id. at 5, 33-34.
335. See id. at 12. The court discusses the efforts in particular of Congressman Jim Saxton. Id.
336. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act may apply in certain cases, but where it does not, and
where appropriate, further amendments excepting appropriate conduct from immunity must be
passed by Congress.
337. VATTEL, supra note 128, at 136 § 71-72.
338. Vattel's The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law was originally published in
1758.
339. See, e.g., In Depth Special, War Against Terror, CNN ONLINE, at http://www.cnn.com/
SPECIALS/200 l/trade.center/.
340. See Casto, supra note 6, at 472-73 (arguing for a "broad" and "liberal" reading of the ATS).
341. See Arlow, supra note 255, at 108-09.
342. If such was the intent, then it must be followed by the courts until Congress states to the
contrary.

from exercising jurisdiction under either the Restatement's standard3 43 or the
political question doctrine. If the ATS is to be applied to crimes against
humanity which are of global mutual concern, the global community must
come together in near-unanimous agreement, and Congress must ratify any

such treaty before the ATS may be, or should be, used in such a fashion.344

V.

CONCLUSION

The ATS is not extraterritorial, as shown by this Article. Furthermore,
universal jurisdiction is not appropriate for the ATS, even if the ATS were to
be extraterritorially applied, because the wrongs over which universal
jurisdiction is to be applied were not in the contemplation of the Framers
upon the ATS' passage.345 Universal jurisdiction, one commentator
has
346
noted, is a "weapon for all nations against international crime."
It has been shown how the universality principle rests upon matters of
immense concern to the world community. 347 It was also noted that modem
ATS litigation focuses on massive, widespread violations of the "law of
nations. 3 48 Courts note the violation 349 and then apply the domestic statute
350
(the ATS) extraterritorially, even though there is no United States nexus,
without pausing to consider the presumption against it, 35' precisely because
the alleged violation is universally hated.352 Unfortunately, this is in
complete contravention to the context in which the ATS was originally
passed.353

343. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987).

344. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2003). Congress has made two important attempts at express
legislation that arguably clarifies ancillary issues to the ATS. See Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 100 Stat. 1214; Torture Victim Protection Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73.
345. See supra Part IV(B).
346. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 264.
347. Kadic illustrates some of these concerns best. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244 (2d
Cir. 1995).
348. See id. at 238; Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 788-89 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
349. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 883-84.
350. Neither Filartiga nor Kadic involved a United States nexus. Tel-Oren arguably did since
some of the plaintiffs were American, but since Tel-Oren dismissed the complaint, this is not as
pertinent.
351. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887-88.
352. Id. at 883-84.
353. Judge Robb wrote in conclusion to his concurring opinion in Tel-Oren, "[m]y colleagues
concede that the origins and purposes of [the ATS] are obscure, but it is certainly obvious that it was
never intended by its drafters to reach this kind of [political terrorism] case." Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at
827 (Robb, J., concurring).
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Thus, a new paradigm of the universality principle consistent with the
intent of congress in passing the ATS must leave behind the massive, globalscale wrongs listed by the universality principle; and instead refocus on what
it was intended to prevent: offenses against individuals that do not concern
issues of concern to the global community. The proper forum for such
concerns is not the United States courtroom.354
Judge Newman's now-famous understatement sums up a lay person's
potential confusion: "Most Americans would probably be surprised to learn
that victims of atrocities committed in Bosnia are suing the leader of the
insurgent Bosnian-Serb forces in a United States District Court in
Manhattan. 355 Indeed, the learned student of international
law might be
356
equally challenged, if less surprised, by this statement.
The Alien Tort Statute is not without great utility and use.357 More
importantly, Congress is always free to amend the statute. 358 The best place
to start would be to clarify the extraterritoriality of the ATS. It currently
should not apply extraterritorially, but is this the current congressional
intent? Does Congress intend it to only apply with the United States nexus?
Will universal jurisdiction apply? If so, is Congress prepared to provide
courts with a clear definition, under its Offenses Clause powers of the law of
nations, of which violations are severe enough to warrant extraterritoriality

354. The proper forums are the United Nations General Assembly, the international press and
media, or even the battlefield. The Framers passed the ATS with this consideration, and their
reasoning and background is as sound today as it was then. When confronted with this issue in the
future, policy makers, judges, and litigants must ask whether exercising universal jurisdiction
involves questions not too little to receive noticefrom the law of nations, but too largefor the court
to address.
355. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1995).
356. As law students, scholars, lawyers, and judges, we carry an admittedly legal-centric view of
the world. The solution to every problem is a lawsuit. The means to punish a criminal is a
conviction in a criminal court. The best power for righting international wrongs is the power of the
American court. Terrorism is an international problem of enormous proportion and potential for
harm. It is sometimes surprising that any Americans call for a trial of the terrorists responsible for
the September I Ith attacks. This is especially so given the country's general support of the Bush
Administration's characterization of the conflict as a "war on terrorism." Wars are meant to be
ordered by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and fought by the military. They are not meant to
be ordered by litigants, confirmed by judges, and fought by lawyers.
357. Briefly, as it now stands, the ATS could be used in the following situation properly: Any
time an alien is harmed by a violation of customary international law either (a) within United States
territory (domestically, the high seas, or U.S. territories such as Guam) or (b) under the Torture
Victim Protection Act.
358. Congress is free to legislate to the contrary, and could simply amend § 1350 to read, "This
law shall be applied extraterritorially in compliance with the Restatement approach to prescriptive
jurisdiction."
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without a United States nexus?
These questions must be addressed, but not by courts. 35 9 As it stands, a
proper jurisprudential reading of the ATS limits its use to any violation of
the law of nations within United States territory, and not beyond. The
universality principle itself illustrates the impossibility of conjoining the
ATS with the universality principle. The ATS can, at most, reach the United
States nexus prescriptive jurisdictions, but the primary use for which it has
been sought by litigants - massive crimes against humanity - are beyond the
scope of the statute and certainly beyond its territorial reach.360
36
Jason Jarvis '

359. Turn once again to Judge Robb's Tel-Oren concurrence: "Courts ought not to serve as
debating clubs for professors willing to argue over what is or what is not an accepted violation of the
law of nations." Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 827 (Robb, J., concurring).
360. I do not advocate stopping all human rights litigation if that is what the political process
deems the appropriate response to human rights violations. I do advocate that courts stop exercising
power they do not have under the statute as it reads and principles of extraterritoriality as they exist.
361. Pepperdine University School of Law (J.D. 2003). The author would like chiefly to thank
Professor Roger P. Alford for his assistance and thoughts as well as the staff and editors of the
Pepperdine Law Review.

